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Jean-Luc Nancy or Justice as Ontology 
of the ‘With’
Carlo Grassi
Justice does not come from the outside (what out-
side?) to hover above the world, in order to repair it 
or bring it to completion. It is given with the world, 
given in the world as the very law of its givenness. 
Strictly speaking, there is no sovereignty, or church, 
or set of laws that is not also the world itself, the sev-
ered [or carved up] trace that is both inextricable 
from its horizon and unaccomplishable. One might 
be tempted to say that there is a justice for the world, 
and there is a world for justice. But these finalities, 
or these reciprocal intentions, say rather poorly what 
such justice is. In itself, the world is the supreme law 
of its justice: not the given world and the ‘such that 
it is,’ but the world that springs forth as a properly 
incongruous incongruity.
—(Nancy, 1998, 189)
This text by Jean-Luc Nancy, presented in 1982 at the 
conference ‘How are we to judge? Building on the work of 
Jean-François Lyotard’, is dedicated to the theme of jus-
tice understood as an ontology of being as tying.
Nancy focuses on two main questions: what is the 
scope of the interrogation ‘how to judge’? In what sense 
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can one say that who judges is at the same time judged by 
his own judgment, incessantly measured with the duty of 
judging?
By addressing these issues, Jean-Luc Nancy examines 
the description of the lawsphere as a harmonic balance 
with different components. This equilibrium, he under-
lines, would be possible only if the nature of the social 
actions could directly derive from a logic recognisable 
and obvious for all. As if there was not an assiduous and 
recurrent dispute between issues and opinions, findings 
and appreciations, being judgment and value statements: 
between the being of things, where meaning is accepted 
as identical for all members of the group, and the value 
of things, which is different for all members. Nowadays 
we have to accept that rules themselves can no longer be 
deduced from a single supreme principle to measure all 
others. In the absence of either any unconditioned crite-
ria to trace back to, or any generalised metalanguage able 
to reconcile the discrepancy between rights and powers, 
the law unsettles, disrupts, disjoins, loses the possibility 
to act as a general equivalent and devotes itself to incom-
mensurability. Unable to govern the lack of any common 
measurement, law appears more connected to rightness 
than to justice: more to adjustment or justness than to the 
métrion (the right measure) or to the koinôn métron (the 
common measure).
This condition does nevertheless not entail a larger 
freedom: it does not discharge itself from the obligation 
to decide; it is not exempt from the duty to pronounce 
and to tackle judgments. The ‘falling short of the law’, 
this breach to the law and of the law are, on the contrary, 
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what ‘condemns [it] to the day of judgement’. It is pre-
cisely the non-deductibility of judgment, indeed, that 
decrees the ‘dies irae’: that opens wide the doors to the 
time of apocalypse, the final verdict, the last judgment. 
Once the earth is Nietzschean-fashion unchained from 
its sun, once inside the dimension that Maurice Blanchot 
defined as the ‘disaster’i, once discarded the use of a nor-
mative original prototype accredited to confer legitimacy 
to all that is compatible with his paradigm, the sentence 
of judging and being judged is the very last instance, 
without any further recourse: it excludes any option of 
appeal and derogation. Not only this; it makes evident 
that each proposition contains an implicit judgment, but 
also it obliges each to define and declare the rules of that 
judgment.
Consequently, freedom is no longer guaranteed by any 
legal, political or economic pattern. Hence, the results 
overlap with the imperative injunction of the responsibil-
ity: ‘responsibility for what is neither knowledge nor rev-
elation, for what is not available, for what does not even 
have concept or signification’ (Nancy, 1999a, 291–292). 
Thus, freedom finally coincides with an unconditional 
demand or an unavoidable requirement to the ethical 
norm that exposes the individual by detecting its fini-
 i ‘If disaster means being separated from the star (if it means the 
decline which characterizes disorientation when the link with the 
fortune on high is cut) then it indicates a fall beneath disastrous 
necessity. Would law be the disaster? The supreme or extreme 
law, that is: the excessiveness of uncodifiable law – that to which 
we are destined without being party to it?’ (Maurice Blanchot, 
1980, p. 2) 
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tude, and performing its limits. Borderlines and freedom 
hit each other in the sense that they ‘figure’, they open to 
the ‘with’: because it is on the shadow line of the former 
that the latter begins. Experience of freedom, according 
to Nancy (1996, 69, 37; 1988a, 71), is the judgment day: 
the ‘spacing of compearance’, the ‘distancing and spacing 
which is that of Being and, at the same time, that of the 
singular and the plural’, the threshold that insists, repeats, 
starts and restarts, begins and recommences, each time 
more irreducible. It renders justice to existence because 
liability both binds and puts together: ‘freedom is imme-
diately linked to equality, or, better still, it is immediately 
equal to equality. Equality does not consist in a commen-
surability of subjects in relation to some unit of measure. 
It is the equality of singularities in the incommensurable 
of freedom’.
Immeasurable, the world itself has a law and remains a 
law unto itself: the law of being at the same time singular 
and plural; the coexistence of singularities that incessantly 
reaffirms and disavows themselves from being confined 
to this world, without reciprocity, without measure, since 
‘always and never affected, the limit is in sum both inher-
ent to and exterior to the singular: it is ex-posed’ (Nancy, 
2000, 104): an elusive world this, a trace of the border 
that exposes singularities to each other, which defines this 
and which leaves them taking place within itself. Today, 
indeed, as Nancy writes (2012, 15; 2005, 195, 196; 2002, 
55), ‘the destitution of the Supreme Being has the direct 
and necessary consequence – the obligation of creating 
a world’. Hence, the world can no longer be understood 
‘as a cosmos, according to the harmony that the Greeks 
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saw’; and even ‘as a world created-separated by a creator 
located elsewhere’. It is, rather, ‘an environment where we 
are and that it is not conceivable that from within. We live 
in a world, and not in front of it. Thus, one can say that 
we never see a world: we are there, we inhabit in it, we 
explore it, we are and we get lost’. It can be said that ‘this 
world is coming out of nothing, there is nothing before it 
and that it is without models, without principle and with-
out given end, and that is precisely what forms the justice 
and the meaning of the world’.
Inferred and not built, judgment imposes dogmati-
cally itself on its subject matter and constitutes the latter 
as a result whose consistency is subordinated to logical 
prerequisites considered as valid always and everywhere. 
Rational necessities predate, include, and govern this 
coherence – that presupposes that they can illuminate 
hidden links of it without any doubt. In this case, judg-
ment appeals to a totality, to terror and totalitarianism 
pertaining to it.
In contrast, there is the judgment that happens, the 
effective and deliberate verdict. It incorporates a body of 
work and proscribes in different contexts and in all sorts 
of sub-contexts. It embodies a multiplicity of movements 
as gesture performances, discursive acts, texts. It agrees 
not to be in charge of the preconditions and to not hav-
ing knowledge of them except when carried out in prac-
tice. In this case, it introduces a different pattern of legal 
normativity: it allows the emergence, between laws and 
facts, of an independent order of combination of rule and 
case. Then, while not eliminated, the aporias of normativ-
ity defer from the ideal of the decision to the decision in 
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a certain place. In short, to the faculty to be, not indices 
of this compound, rather factors of related connections: 
to be builders of new and unknown relationships into the 
series in which they appear and they initiate. Disputes 
no longer appear in a network of concepts defined in 
advance, but they acquire a new relevance by investing 
into the margins that normally circumscribe the dimen-
sions of the field and constitute the circumstances. There-
fore, the link between facts and categories looks as if it 
is challenged, refuted, by the importance that indetermi-
nate plurality of conjunctures acquires in opposition to 
the localised extension of norms.
Viewed in this way, the question posed by Nancy folds 
and enfolds in two margins that balance and overlap each 
other. On one hand, the law that is absent. A negative 
aspect that becomes a positive condition, the advantage 
of a bond, the usefulness of a tie: we have to create the law. 
On the other hand, the non-coincidence of law with the 
law of nature: the dissolution of any preliminary guaran-
tee requiring the faculty of judging to transform its dis-
proportion when measured.
These margins, briefly, obliterate the distinction 
between legal norms, which refer to a code, and the rules 
of the games, establishing programs. These norms bear 
reference to a specific system that will enable them. The 
rules structure the processes and are justified by the game 
itself: by the only motive that the guidelines leave possible 
to carry out. The former need a reason to depend on and 
to respond to: a theory or an ideology that claims an 
authority and ensures that it is legitimate. The latter, con-
trariwise, are self-sufficient: it is simply enough to play 
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the game that stems from them. Which means that it is 
not supposed to trace back to a primeval norm to repro-
duce mimetically, but to recognise the obligation to estab-
lish rules. This is the law of the law, which judges reason, 
handing it to judgment.
Once we consider the differentiation boundaries, inter-
section and dispersal related to the antithesis between 
code and program, then we may address the principle by 
which we cannot pass a judgment about something if we 
have not previously defined the object on which to output 
an assessment. We next interrogate the fact that, because 
community and disparity of intents, agreement and disa-
greement, communication and negotiation become possi-
ble, we need a preliminary and prejudicial discrimination 
between two distinct plans of correspondences: between 
assessments and appreciations, reality and thought, 
ontology and noology. We pose the query, in other words, 
about the immeasurable structuring between, on one side 
a figurative aspect, designation, reality itself that solicits 
us or asks us something; and, on the other side, a discursive 
aspect, commentary, meaning, a desire to stop the flow of 
opportunity and to frame it in a more or less stable hier-
archy. Alternatively, quoting Jacques Derrida (1980, 119) 
on Heidegger (1938a, 131–132; 1938b, 90–92), empha-
sising the world understood as a ‘presence (Anwesen) 
which seizes man or attaches itself to him rather than 
being seen, intuited (angeschaut) by him’, where it is the 
‘man who is taken over and regarded by what-is’: where 
the man is ‘also an object, Gegenstand ’. And yet on the 
other hand retaining ‘an idea as an image in and for 
the subject, an affection of the subject in the form of a 
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relationship to the object which is in it as a copy, a paint-
ing or a scene’. 
There is thus a sharing, in the twofold meaning of strip-
ping away and partaking, as a contraction between inside 
and outside: two-steps and a flow of reduction and ampli-
fication between legal norms and rules of the game. ‘The 
one’ – Derrida insists (1967, 369–370) cited by Nancy 
(1982a, 249) – ‘seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering 
a truth or an origin which escapes play’. ‘The other, which 
is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play’. The 
telos of rules, Nancy concludes (Dies Irae), is not some-
thing given in advance, an original model to join or to 
resume, but it answers to another disposition: ‘to inhabit 
the world’.
Being affected by the game rules environment means 
that everything connected to the realm of the sacred fades 
from the body of law. Lex æterna and lex naturalis aban-
don the field at the sole initiative of the lex humana, leav-
ing the latter exposed to a new freedom because it finally 
finds in itself the strength and the sense that it requires. 
Within such a framework, normativity follows a double 
prescription. On the one hand, in the judgment is intro-
duced the infinite remoteness of its telos. On the other 
hand, declining to establish the effectiveness of a judg-
ment over an authority that foreruns and overwhelms it, 
the law ends by accepting the justification based on its 
simple performativity. That is to say, its ability to make 
valid and actual the generalisation of a system of singu-
lar plural dispositions through a function of agency and 
pacification.
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Lacking a source of authority stemming from a 
previously established power, the law is in charge of 
legitimising this same power: it accomplishes this, by 
establishing itself as its own decisive limit. Authority, 
therefore, presents itself as legibus alligata. Exposed 
to laws, the authority accepts a general and preventive 
restriction that may decide on its revocability: limita-
tion acting as controller, but at the same time, giving to 
authority the eminent dignitas that assures its recogni-
tion. This issue concerning the origin of power has very 
important consequences for social organisation. If the 
force of authority has an extra-human origin, societies 
cannot freely choose to structure themselves in one way 
or another: they must observe obsequiously the dicta-
tion of a transcendent will. When, on the contrary, we 
put the emphasis on its political source, we may entrust 
the legitimation to the experimental action (praxis) of 
the universitas civium.
Nomos and exousia, law and power expose each other. 
That is how, from one side, the first encloses the other 
but does not exist separately, and then also depends on it. 
While, from the other side, the second does not automati-
cally equate with oppression or coercion. The strange in-
betweenness of this couple exposes to us, not to itself, and 
we are exposed to it. As Nancy writes (2014, 43), ‘it can 
expose–in the sense of make appear [faire paraître]–the 
exposition, in the sense of a limitless endangerment’. 
Hence, in the exposition, the compearance of the demos, 
the people, the ones with the others, offers itself as a body 
where energéō (ἐνεργέω) and katargéō (καταργέω), pow-
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erful and powerless, will to power and will to chance, 
become interdependent and intermingle. Once enforced, 
they both cannot escape criticism and challenges: ‘the 
people’ – Nancy continues (ib., 33) – ‘remain or oper-
ate from within a compulsion to dissolve/reinvent the 
bond (of the law). Dissolution opens onto the infinity 
and absenting to oneself [à soi- même]. But reinvention is 
not a simple, determinate identification since sovereignty 
exceeds the law that it disqualifies [récuse] while found-
ing it’.
In contrast with ‘the polarity subject/citizen’, Nancy 
(1993, 112) rejects the tradition that, as Hannah Arendt 
(1961, 157) describes well, ‘is almost unanimous in hold-
ing [that] freedom begins where men have left the realm 
of political life inhabited by the many, and that it is not 
experienced in association with others but in intercourse 
with one’s self ’. This indicates a public freedom, anteri-
ority over a private or interior freedom. Or, to be more 
precise, for Nancy (1993, 115; 1988a, 72) ‘the common 
will’ of the population acts as fraternity and is superior 
to any other authority in the sense that fraternity ‘is not 
the relation of those who unify a common family, but the 
relation of those whose Parent, or common substance, 
has disappeared, delivering them to their freedom and 
equality’. That is ‘fraternity’ without father or mother, 
anterior and posterior to all law and common substance. 
Or if it were possible to conceive of ‘fraternity’ as Law 
and as substance: incommensurable, nonderivable. And 
if it is necessary to put in these seizure of speech (prise de 
parole): the emergence of passage of some one and every 
one into the enchainment of sense effect’.
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At the outset, groups of co-citizens or fellow citizens 
fraternise in a social relationshipii. Like Nietzsche in The 
Gay Science (1882a, § 335, 212), they say ‘we, however, 
want to become those we are – human beings who are 
new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, 
who create themselves!’iii. By their conscious and vol-
untary association, ‘with and in “civil”[“concitoyenne”] 
coexistence as such’ (Nancy, 1996, 31), current actions of 
all co-citizens and of each person create and develop a 
body of valuable rights in a territory and for an alliance of 
people. They design a set of rules whose validity does not 
derive from the society as a whole, nor from the polis as 
an abstract body, source, state or centre of the authority, 
but rather from the concerted actions of the very same 
men, who produce, use and judge itiv.
Nancy emphasises (1988b, 89; 1988a, 74; 1996, 83), 
that these co-citizens live in ‘an age in rupture. Which 
 ii Émile Benveniste (1970, 274; see also Balibar, 1989 and 2012) ex-
plains that the meaning of ‘civis’ is precisely ‘co-citizen’. ‘The Greek 
word polites and the Latin word civis, both of which we translate as 
citizen, i.e., the active member of a “city” (…). In Latin the word 
civis is often constructed with a possessive pronoun, such as in civis 
meus or cives nostri. Once again, we find ourselves compelled to 
profoundly question the common translation with “citoyen” (“citi-
zen”, “Bürger”). For what could “my citizen”, spoken by any person, 
possibly mean? The construction with the possessive reveals in fact 
the true meaning of civis, which is a term of reciprocal value and 
not an objective designation: he who is civis for me is someone for 
whom I am the civis. The best approximation would be the name 
“co-citizen” or “fellow citizen”, in terms of a mutual relation.’
 iii ‘Wir wollen die werden, die wir sind - die Neuen, die Einmaligen, die 
Unvergleichbaren, die Sich-selber-Gesetzgebenden, die Sich-selber-
Schaffenden!’ (Nietzsche, 1882b, § 335).
 iv ‘Creation is not first of all production, but expression, exposition or 
extraneation of the “self ”’ (Nancy, 1999b, 275).
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means also: they take responsibility for this age, because 
the questions they are discussing, and especially here, 
obviously engage in all the ethical and political chal-
lenges of our time’. They therefore allow themselves to 
replace the royal palace with the public space (political 
space or the political as spacing) of the agora (even if ‘the 
images of the agora or forum could be misleading’) and 
feel free to do so because they look at the past with eyes 
that no tradition distracts. In this sense, they trigger a 
commencement that is more than a starting point. It is 
a continual creation of a plurality of origins: ‘it is both 
a principle and an appearing; as such, it repeats itself at 
each moment of what it originates’.
To put it in a different way, they open a breach in which 
it can finally get its consistency:
i. a freedom experienced by acting and associating 
with each other’s;
ii. an authority without mores and customs; 
iii. norms established empirically no longer subject to 
time-honoured standards and patterns. 
There is, Nancy writes (1988b, 92), ‘not freedom as the 
property of a subject (“the subject is free”), but freedom 
as the very experience of coming into presence, of being 
given up, necessarily/freely given up to the to (the to of 
the “towards”, of the “for”, of the “in view of ”, of the “in 
the direction of ”, of the “along side”, the to of abandoning 
to, of the offering to, of “to one’s core”, of the “with regard 
to”, of the “to the limit”, and also of the “to the detriment 
of ”, “to the bitter end”: freedom is wherever it is necessary 
to make up one’s mind to...)’.
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These concives futuri, ‘children of the future’, ‘Kinder der 
Zukunft’, are open to the adveniens. Likewise in The Dawn of 
Day of Nietzsche (1881, 8), they are in fact initiated into the 
mystery of Trophonius; in order to access his cave they must 
drink consecutively Lethe’s water, which clears the mind 
of the memory of the past, and Mnemosyne’s water, which 
enables the holding back of what would otherwise happenv. 
Therefore, they reach the contents of their alliance in the 
darkness of becoming and moving: in an interval between 
event and form, nunc fluens and nunc stans, in an ‘interspace 
between world and toy’, between ‘stream and stone’vi.
Otherwise, in the words of Emmanuel Lévinas (1957, 
47), they touch the thickness of their link in the dark 
vault: ‘a future already sensed in the present, but still leav-
ing a pretext for decision’ and hence in a wave of the time 
to come considered as a strength and not as a burden. 
Namely, Nancy highlights (1999a, 293, 295; 1991, 372), 
the future intended ‘not in the sense of something that 
will “definitely be there tomorrow” but, on the contrary, 
in the sense of something risked in the manner of the 
unknown and unforeseeable character of what is still to 
come’. Consisting in ‘an encounter, a work, an event; and 
 v ‘We children of the future. We “conserve” nothing; neither do 
we want to return to any past periods’. ‘Wir Kinder der Zukunft’. 
Wir “konservieren” nichts, wir wollen auch in keine Vergangenheit 
zurück’ (Nietzsche, 1882a § 377, 338; Nietzsche, 1882b, § 377, 277; 
see also Nietzsche, 1887, Second Essay: ‘Guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and 
related matters, § 24).
 vi (Rilke, 1911–1922, 30, 16), Duino Elegies: ‘im Zwischenraume zwis-
chen Welt und Spielzeug’, The Fourth Elegy; ‘zwischen Strom und 
Gestein’, The Second Elegy. 
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once the future has become present, once the encounter 
has taken place, the work realized, the event faded, then 
sense—their own sense—moves along again, passing 
beyond and elsewhere’. Where we live as it was ‘the Day of 
Judgment’. The dies irae, the day of divine wrath is, unde-
niably, ‘no longer a day at all but a night from which our 
days are obstinately woven’.
From there, continues Lévinas (ib., 42, 47, 50, 51), 
starts the conjunction and the adjustment between 
memory and imagination that testify ‘at the same time 
being and experience of being’, ‘control and possession, 
as a field of forces in which human existence stands, in 
which it is engaged’. Where ‘the self that is in their grasp 
decides, is engaged, takes responsibility’. Where, he con-
cludes ‘ “to exist” becomes both a transitive verb like “to 
take” or “to seize”, and a reflexive verb like “to feel” [se 
sentir] or “to stand” [se tenir]. The reflectivity conveyed by 
this verb is not a theoretical vision, but already an event 
of existing itself; not a consciousness, but already engage-
ment, a way of being, qualified by all the circumstances 
one would have been tempted to take for settings’. This 
state of being alive, ‘in which the existent is both sepa-
rated from everything and engaged in this everything, is 
associated with the social experience in which the auton-
omy of personal existence is not separated from belong-
ing to the group’.
In this way, the co-citizens build a particular rule that 
steers against the supposedly objective law. Leading to 
a deconsecration of the auctoritas morphed to a simple 
device, left without the function of general equivalent 
and thaumaturgy for resolution of disputes. They claim 
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their heterogeneous subjectivity, ‘singular plural’, by 
which normativity is legitimate solely when it respects 
and enforces the inevitable presence of the différend: 
exclusively when it derives from conflict and negotiation 
between separate, different, antagonistic, even conflicting 
positions. They thus dethrone the metajuridical principle 
related to lex æterna and lex naturalis insofar as they – 
the co-citizens – consider that these two elements are not 
able to define the commune mensura that tames the exces-
siveness of the ‘singular plural’: they underscore that the 
two aspects are pure and simple choices. 
They also overturn the hierarchy granting the state 
the role of absolute source of authority understood as 
collective consciousness synthesising and safeguarding 
the spiritual and material interests of the society’s mem-
bers. Bounded by law, subject to the law, a government 
can create or change laws, but after that, it must comply 
with it. A government remains devoid of valid investiture 
and becomes wrongful usurpation when it concentrates 
a higher power than that allowed by the regulations in 
force, when it disregards laws, interprets contra natura, 
or when, to preserve the exercise of power, uses intimida-
tion or restriction of rights. ‘The institution of the law by 
the will’ – Nancy writes (Dies Irae) – ‘is itself designated 
only through submission’, but ‘undoubtedly, the mode of 
this submission is not that of subservience to a constraint 
that would be incompatible with freedom’. The law, as 
Hannah Arendt (1961, 187, 189, 166) points out, is not a 
command given to subjects by a power, but the capacity 
to relate co-citizens: ‘the original meaning of the word lex 
is “intimate connection” or relationship, namely some-
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thing which connects two things or two partners whom 
external circumstances have brought together’. Therefore, 
the law does not ‘require a transcendent source of author-
ity for its validity, that is, an origin which must be beyond 
human power’, but only an ‘organized multitude whose 
power was exerted in accordance with laws and limited 
by them’.
The populus, meaning the complete populus without 
any exceptions, i.e. universitas concivium, ‘primordial 
plurality that co-appears’, ‘simultaneity of being-with, 
where there is no “in itself ” that is not already immedi-
ately “with”’ (Nancy, 1996, 67, 68), is the ultimate source 
of legal authority for the simple reason that quod omnes 
tangit ab omnibus approbari debet: each one must approve 
what pertains to everyone. Obviously, if what affects eve-
ryone must be approved by any other actor, by extension 
the exercise of political power is legitimate only in estab-
lished boundaries: a political power that does not set any 
limitation is nothing else than tyranny or ‘empire’. Law 
pilots the government and provides the verification pro-
cedures by the popular assent without which government 
itself loses any legitimacy.
From this standpoint, there is a new priority afforded 
to a jointed/disjointed multiplicity of ‘lifetime’ as a politi-
cal node. This primacy grasps and gives voice to everyday 
life. It neutralises thus the coherent rational argument as 
unique possibility and pushes forward the recourse to 
sensitive intuition, enabling the acceptance and under-
standing of contradiction and paradox. The trust in per-
sonal responsibility and in individual initiative becomes 
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the key fulcrum of the social organisation. Finally, unin-
terrupted communication brought forward by personal 
media encourages an active and concerned participation 
of any singularity within public debate. It promotes the 
dissemination of organised groups and free associations. 
Often excluded from the political area, the co-citizens can 
then be auto-structured in the form of specific affiliations 
promoting their own statutes. These co-citizens thus 
introduce unusual relations that displace the political 
game and jeopardise the regulation of its related policy 
frameworks by refusing the dispositions with which the 
latter would like to capture them. They indeed bring to 
light the presence of multitude: the obscene world of the 
uncountable, incalculable and innumerable.
This particular law ‘concitoyenne’ has not the character 
of a codification: it bypasses the established measures that 
serve primarily to be applied. It performs indeed a dynamic 
process of a simple look-up table correlating facts and their 
respective qualifications and, drawing on Jacques Derrida 
(1980, 124), in this context, it announces ‘a coming to dis-
closure, to appearance, to patency, to phenomenality rather 
than the prepositionality of an objective being-before’. It 
improves an engagement that privileges innovation over 
continuity. Far from finding its groundings in the anamne-
ses of the past, it emerges as a project at the end of a col-
lective effort of designing, duly circumscribed in its course, 
and its origin and its end. That is a common program, 
which, beyond all individual, social, and cultural differ-
ences, is the invitation to create a proper aggregation, not 
by virtue of the same origin but of shared aims.
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This adverts to the denial of all systems and of all 
beliefs that reflect the authority of the good old days, 
and displays concomitantly the renunciation of the nat-
ural world as basis of legitimation. From the common 
program emerges the pervasiveness of what occurs in a 
mutual agreement: its core purpose is the revolt against 
pre-established conditions and the refusal of not only 
tradition as such, but the authority of all traditions. 
This prevalence is characterised also by the scepticism 
around cultural heritage. The diffidence towards a fro-
zen image of the past assaults the a posteriori identifi-
cation with what has been successful in former times. 
From this position, the idea that all that has already hap-
pened becomes immutable is collapsed, and we stop to 
side with the last or the most recent winner. The main 
outcome is an open experience of history according to 
which the past manifests itself as charged with the time 
of now, as a choice but also as an occasion: as a memory 
that is constantly erased and renewed, within which 
what is valued the most is the capacity to pursue freely 
chosen objectives, to reach independently established 
goals. By prioritising the becoming rather than the 
belonging, the pre-eminence of the future helps to make 
more habitable a world that defies us all the time. The 
emerging present, always ‘to come’, gains primacy over 
ageless roots as the starting point. Equally, metamor-
phosis predominates over the familiar and the habitual; 
hence, alterity prevails over identity and disruption over 
convergence. This process enhances the prerogatives 
of plurality, disparity, heterogeneity, chance, and thus 
we reach what Nancy (1996, 202; see also Esposito and 
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Nancy, 2001) calls the ‘unachieved and unachievable 
essence of the “with”’.
Law inevitably contains in its corpus many series of 
unavoidable contradictions. On the one hand, it provides 
descriptions that refer restrictively to itself and its own 
ordinations. The archaic potency that anticipates and 
prefigures legal normativity becomes unnecessary, so 
confining its implication within its specific set of rules. 
It refers mainly to a movement of thought that does not 
take into account any previous knowledge and which rids 
itself of its author. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it 
frames actions, establishes a univocal meaning and then 
crystallises the principles and values landscape shared by 
the community. In other words, it wedges a hierarchy of 
priorities that is generally also a moral one; it ballasts the 
plasticity of social processes, and finally places restric-
tions on the actions and on meaning freely attributed by 
social actors.
Thus, Nancy focuses on the necessary reciprocity of 
the legal relationship between those who temporarily 
manage public affairs and the population to whom they 
belong. This intersection provides that the ruling class 
does not curate the power, but performs a function that 
is subordinate. Through the quality of administrators, 
they are subservient to the charge they are responsible 
for, because they are not masters, but servants of the pub-
lic singular plural who is the real dominus. Therefore, by 
drawing from the law its potestas, the right to rule, law 
needs to subordinate itself to its own provisions. These 
are therefore put on the agenda, those issues concern-
ing the demarcation of governmental action and the 
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obligation of public recognition, the active participation 
of groups of co-citizens in political life and affirmation of 
fundamental human rights: ‘this is, to be sure, a matter of 
human rights, but, first of all, as the rights of human beings 
to tie (k)nots of sense’ (Nancy, 1993, 115).
In this frame, rather than the ideal of totality, Nancy 
(1999a, 289) affirms the ‘disjunctive conjunction’ of ‘sin-
gular plural’ which means that each singularity corre-
sponds to all other singularities. In this sense, becoming 
a man means to put each other in the double position of 
judging and being judged. 
Far from invoking a universal tablet of rules that we 
should strictly observe, it must appear through exposure, 
it must ‘compear’. At any time, to be ‘responsible for being, 
for God, for the law, for death, for birth, for existence’. 
In judging – he writes (Dies Irae) – ‘I venture a “reason” 
(or an unreason), that is so judged by what it attempts 
or risks’. Consequently, I do expose myself to freedom, to 
the will of chance, into my own body understood as a res 
intensa: tragic hiatus (spacing-opening) of irremediable 
disputes never solvable. I am judged against the measure 
of the world that I attempt, for which I try my chance, and 
not against the measure of a world that is already estab-
lished. Every attempt is my final judgement’vii.
 vii ‘“La comparution”: refers to the act of appearing in court having 
been summoned. “Summoning” carries a much stronger notion 
of agency than the more disembodied comparution and lacks the 
commonality implied in the prefix. The Scottish commonlaw term 
“compearance” - although foreign to most English ears - conveys 
the meaning exactly and I have retained it’ (Strong, 1992, 371).
Jean-Luc Nancy or Justice as Ontology of the ‘With’ 21
All this reveals how the sphere of law at the last corre-
lates with a constitutive plurality of irreconcilable factors. 
It governs the past because it decides upon the resulting 
consequences and thus adjudicates the last stage of its 
meaning. It governs the future, on which rests the weight 
of the attributions of responsibilities arising out from its 
given interpretations. However, its power is fully carried 
out only in the present because, until a judgment is pend-
ing, it opens a breach in the chronological window: time 
is petrified for the subjects who remain unable to move 
forward or backward until the final ruling. Even more 
dramatically in case of minors, it opens a little not-space-
temps at the core of time and time just progresses without 
moving because it stays always hovering and teetering on 
the edge of the decision. ‘Thus, of itself, what is positive 
intervenes in the law as the contingent and arbitrary, but 
only to put a term to the process of decision’ (Nancy 1982b, 
141).
The option of choice Nancy concludes (1991, 372; 
1993, 111; 1990, 147), entails a common condition that 
exposes the little not-space-temps to us: ‘we compear 
before it - neither “post” nor “pre”. But it is the pre-
sent that is made for us’. This common condition has 
no denouement. It is a strange loop lacking conclusion 
and untying: ‘without any end other than the enchain-
ment of (k)nots’. The jurisdiction brings into play a sort 
of ‘art of the weaver’, an ‘infinite tying’ that makes up 
a network of the ‘communicability’ where the concives 
futuri can inhabit ‘neither cosmos (“smile of the Immor-
tals”) nor mundus (“vale of tears”), but the very place 
of sense’.
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Surviving themselves and events, bodies and actors 
(personae) guarantee, judge, arbitrate. They create 
storylines in which they try to compose a logic, tie and 
untie the contradictory knots correlating the assertion 
of the presence/absence of something with the descrip-
tion of a meaningful context. Between document and 
monument, trace and memory, autopsy and archaeol-
ogy, they testify and question the complex relation-
ships between who relates, who listens, who tells a story. 
Between firstly those reports to refer to and, secondly, 
those records that are received, who testifies is at the 
same time the hearer of a story in which he himself is 
told. He himself is revealed in the sequence of events, in 
what he says, in what he means, in what he omits, in 
what he leaves out, in what the others recall directly and 
indirectly: clear, convinced, precise, or uncertain, vague, 
confused, hesitant. The difficult research for an accept-
able description, for each one and for all, passes through 
a narrative pragmatics that presents just a few options 
among the plethoric possible scenarios: accepting that, 
at the end of the process, only a few stories prevail. 
The result is composite histories, coherent-incoherent 
agglutinations of snippets torn to pieces, arbitrarily 
arranged, awkwardly adjusted, clumsily adapted, unskil-
fully pasted together. 
At the last (Dies Irae; see also Nancy 1999b and 
1999c), ‘the day of judgement is not dies irae, the 
day or rather night of religion and fear, it is only dies 
illa, that illustrious day, the sublime day when free-
dom, law, and the other give me order and the gift 
of judging’.
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One must have confidence that the court allows the 
majesty of the law its full scope, for this is its sole 
duty. Within the law all is accusation, advocacy, and 
verdict; any interference by an individual here would 
be a crime. (Kafka)2
Those two races still preserve pagan terms. They 
have no word for Christmas (which they call ‘Jul’) or 
for the Last Day or General Judgment. This they call 
‘Ragnarok.’ (Joyce)3
 1 This document is a transcription of the paper presented by Jean-
Luc Nancy at the conference ‘Comment juger? À partir de Jean-
François Lyotard’ (‘How are we to judge? Building on the work of 
Jean-François Lyotard’), directed by Michel Enaudeau and Jean-
Loup Thébaud, at Cerisy-la-Salle, 24 July – 3 August 1982, at the 
Centre Culturel International de Cerisy-la-Salle, directed by Edith 
Heurgon. We wish to thank Jean-Luc Nancy and Edith Heurgon for 
permitting us to publish this text in English translation. The bibli-
ography was created by Carlo Grassi.
 2 Franz Kafka, Advocates, trans. Tania Stern and James Stern, in Col-
lected Stories, ed. Gabriel Josipovici (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1993), 417.
 3 James Joyce, Letter to James Stephen, 7 May 1932, in Letters of James 
Joyce, ed. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Viking, 1957), 318.
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And so let us begin at the beginning. That is, with the 
Greek. If I take the name ‘Lyotard’ and separate the two 
syllables (as Baruchello did on the cover of Au juste, pub-
lished in English translation as Just Gaming), and pro-
nounce it in Greek: ‘luô tar’, I find that it reads ‘I judge, 
know it!’, ‘I loose, I separate (luô), I judge, yes, you can 
trust me on that!’ (tar is a crasis for toi ara, ‘to you, then’, 
which can be translated as ‘I tell you’, ‘know it’). Lyotard 
himself says ‘luô tar’ when he claims: I write for political 
reasons, because it could be useful, because, for example, 
it seems to me that the prescriptions of what I call pagan-
ism should be followed.4
I judge, then. Lyotard, ultimately, has continued to 
emphasise this obvious fact in his latest work, or more 
precisely he has continued to call us to face this obvious 
fact (as others call a speaker to order): I judge, we judge. 
We impute actions, attribute values, assign aims. A whole 
vein of becoming-modern and postmodernity in thought, 
art, and politics has been conducted according to one of 
its specific traits, that of presenting itself as purely ‘consta-
tive’, in the manner of a sort of infra-Hegelian necessity 
(while of course claiming to be anti-Hegelian). They made 
statements about the era’s destiny and its tendencies. They 
described a collapse, a fragmentation, mechanisms, con-
nections, desires, and pleasures. Lyotard reminded us that 
all that involved judgement—in both senses of the expres-
sion: it already included a judgement, and it called for 
judgement. He therefore roused this modern reasoning 
 4 Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud, Just Gaming, 
trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1985), 17.
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from its anti-dogmatic slumber. It no longer believed that 
it judged, it recoiled at the very suggestion that it enforced 
the law when all our sentences, as it believed, had already 
been passed or were being passed. It had nourished itself 
in private on Hegelian judgement, this judgement pro-
nounced simultaneously by all things (since ‘all things are 
a judgement’)5 and by the . . . ‘world’s court of judgement’.6 
But in reality it judges and must judge, and with a very 
different sort of judgement from that of the world’s court 
of judgement. Lyotard judges that we judge, and that we 
must judge. And I judge this with him—by which I mean 
more and something different from simply recognising 
the importance of his work or subscribing to certain prop-
ositions. I share—in the strongest sense of the word—in 
the movement of this judgement. And my only aim here 
today is to explain this sharing, that is, a commonality of 
movement that precedes by a long way any discussion of 
theses, and a difference in the manner of responding to 
it, a difference which undoubtedly gives rise to discussion 
(that discussion that Patrice Loraux warmly recommended 
to us yesterday), but which does not lead to a confronta-
tion. Although I shall try to respond in a different way to 
the question how are we to judge?, I will not be confront-
ing Lyotard’s own response with an antagonistic one. For, 
as we know, this question brings into play the very game 
 5 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophi-
cal Sciences in Basic Outline: Part 1: Science of Logic, ed. and trans. 
Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), §167, 243.
 6 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, 
ed. Stephen Houlgate, trans. Thomas Knox (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), §340, 315.
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(or system) of response. But nor will I be idly playing a 
language game of my own, in parallel with Lyotard’s. More 
‘seriously’, if I may say so, but without the ‘seriousness’ of 
the metaphysical phrase (that sentence whose criterion is 
always-already guaranteed by its own terms), I am trying 
to ask: what does the question, how are we to judge?, want 
from us?
This attempt cannot be, and does not aim to be, sys-
tematic (but you may well judge that it is already too sys-
tematic . . . ). On principle, by the principle of the very 
absence of principle that is inscribed at the heart of the 
question, I shall avoid producing a sustained and unitary 
form of speech. I also feel bound to a certain poverty, and 
thus to a certain slowdown in answering this question. 
What does the question want from us, since it precludes 
a response, any response that would be full, direct, and 
truthful (let us say, an onto-theological response)? And 
yet what does it want from us, since it is asked, and it is 
asked because, in fact, we judge? We must first respond 
to the insistence of the fact of the question, rather than 
the demand or interrogation as such. To ‘respond’ then 
means to experience and obey. We must experience this 
insistence, and obey it, and so commit to taking it up, 
repeating it (which means, in Latin, to ask again) several 
times and in several ways. I shall try to repeat, to recite the 
question, the fact and the question of judgement—to let 
us feel the weight and insistence of their demands. Since 
I am—since we are—already caught in these demands, 
and already judged by them.
We will come back to this later, but I shall say this much 
without any further delay: when I judge, I am judged. At 
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every moment I am measured against the demands of 
the duty to judge, and measured against the insistence—
perhaps beyond measure—of the question of judgement. 
That moment when I judge, whether yesterday, today, or 
tomorrow, is always the day of my judgement: dies irae. 
For these reasons I shall speak in discontinuous frag-
ments (seven of them), without recourse to any theory 
of fragmentation, but quite simply responding to that 
insistence and that poverty—or again, to that aspect of 
the question that forestalls my speech, interrupts my dis-
course. For judging is not the same thing as discussing; 
even less so, being judged.
One.—Lyotard deploys Kantian resources—or one fun-
damental Kantian resource—to respond to a question 
that is not in itself Kantian. The question how are we to 
judge? does not present itself to Kant, who is instead con-
cerned with showing the soundness of the judgement 
employed in critical reason, which both makes it capa-
ble of judging itself, and unfailingly reveals to that criti-
cal reason the rule that it must follow. The question is no 
sooner posed than it is resolved—better still: the fact of its 
being posed is already its resolution. As the introduction 
to the ‘Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judge-
ment’ states, transcendental logic has the privilege of not 
abandoning judgement to its nature as a ‘peculiar talent’ 
that ‘cannot be taught’,7 since ‘besides the rule . . . it can 
also specify a priori the instance to which the rule is to be 
 7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Smith 
(London: MacMillan, 1929), 178. [Translation modified].
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applied’, and this instance is one in which we are limited 
to the ‘sensible condition’ of experience.8 Correlatively, 
the faculty of judgement, which is excluded for that very 
reason from theoretical reason (its dialectical lapsus with 
regard to the unconditional) returns as a practical factum 
of reason, which urges it to judge (and to act) according 
to the unconditional and universal. Since this universal—
this final end—could not be made present, we shall judge 
it analogically, or as if, by a regulative Idea or a postu-
late—which will be for example, and more than just an 
example, a kingdom of ends in the form of a community 
of reasonable beings.
It seems to me that Just Gaming retains the essence of 
this argument. I shall not repeat here a reading of this 
book (and in any case, I cannot concern myself at present 
with all sorts of other propositions or suggestions in the 
book which intersect with this argument without always 
being strictly subordinate to it; nor shall I concern myself 
with the differences between Just Gaming and later texts 
by Lyotard: for they do not affect, as I see it, the essence 
of this ‘regulative’ argument). The rule, in Just Gaming, 
is precisely ‘the Idea of a totality of reasonable beings’, 
which is valid only as a ‘postulate [that] is only postulated 
. . . as a horizon . . . , an Idea, without any reality’.9 And 
this rule is provided by ‘a reflective use of judgement, that 
is, a maximization of concepts outside of any knowledge 
 8 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 179.
 9 Lyotard, Just Gaming, 76–7. Lyotard is referring to the idea of 
a ‘whole of rational beings’, in Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals [1785], ed. and trans. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 62.
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of reality’.10 The difference with Kant, however, is found in 
the nature or the content of the Idea: in place of the Kan-
tian Idea of a final totality or unity, we must substitute ‘the 
horizon of a multiplicity or of a diversity’,11 and the goal of 
‘the idea of a justice that would at the same time be that of 
a plurality’.12 Lyotard is perfectly aware of what he is get-
ting himself into. He states that, ‘when one thinks of jus-
tice according to a nonunitary teleology, one tends merely 
to reverse what was implied in Kant’s doctrine’.13 And it 
seems that we should read this critique of a ‘simple rever-
sal’ as being homologous to the critique that Heidegger 
directed at Nietzsche on the subject of Platonism. Lyotard 
overcomes or outplays the difficulty by appealing to the 
irreducibility of language games (narrative, prescriptive, 
etc.), which justice maintains in their irreducibility to one 
another, a justice that therefore leads us finally to the con-
stitutive plurality of language, to the absence of ‘universal 
language or generalized metalanguage’.14 From this point, 
justice consists in never speaking the law—one law for all 
language, the terror. And the single paradoxical prescrip-
tive of universal value ‘prescribes the observance of the 
singular justice of each game’.15
I am not sure that the difficulty he recognises is entirely 
overcome in this way, nor that he has eliminated the risk 
of remaining in a ‘reversal’ of Kant, and furthermore we 
might wonder how far he actually reverses a Kantian idea 
 10 Ibid. 75.
 11 Ibid. 87.
 12 Ibid. 95.
 13 Ibid. 96.
 14 Ibid. 98.
 15 Ibid. 100.
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of community that is a long way, if we look closely, from 
excluding diversity and plurality in favour of a simple 
totalisation.16 In fact, we find ourselves faced with the 
functioning of two terms: on the one hand we have the 
Idea of plurality as such, which subsists, if I may put it 
this way, as an Idea, which is the Idea of the law as law of 
language, or language as law, and which expresses itself 
as such, in something like a universal singularity; on the 
other hand we have the given, established, exposed par-
ticularity of language games, which is also, as Lyotard 
emphasises, a dynamic, inventive, or creative particular-
ity, modifying its own rules, producing new ‘moves’, and 
testing the limits of each singular field of play. The logic 
of their functioning is that the two terms must judge one 
another. In the first case, the Idea judges the particular-
ity. That is, since it makes no prescription about how the 
particularity should be dissected, it prescribes only that 
there must be a universal presence of particularity. And, 
in these conditions, either the Idea continues to act as 
a final, unitary, totalising (but not totalitarian) Idea—it 
remains an onto-theo-teleological Idea, even though it is 
actually only an ‘as if-onto-theo-teleology’ (after all, how 
does the ‘the ‘as if-’, change its structure? It inscribes it 
with the mark of unreality: but isn’t that nothing more 
than a reversal of ontological realism?)—, or alternatively 
(or rather at the same time, since the two hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive), the particularity to which we 
 16 This same point also emerges from Lyotard’s later work on Kant’s 
political thought. Cf. Jean-François Lyotard, Enthusiasm: The 
Kantian Critique of History, trans. Georges Van den Abbeele (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
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must do justice presents itself empirically and without 
any Idea of itself other than the general Idea of particu-
larity, according to the circumstances, games, inventions, 
and modifications at hand. Lyotard says that justice must 
intervene to purify impure games, such as narrations that 
are infiltrated by prescriptions17: but from what stand-
point can the types of ‘purity’ in question be determined? 
Once again, either from the empirical—if there can be 
such a thing as empirical purity—, or from an Idea which 
would then exceed the limits of the simple Idea of par-
ticularity in general. In this first case—or, perhaps, in this 
first moment of functioning—, it would therefore not be 
impossible that we might stay trapped in the classic oppo-
sition between the ideal and the empirical, which allows 
for both of these elements, whether dialectically or not, 
to be satisfied. But this satisfaction is very unlikely, as we 
know, to be that of justice. There can be a terrorism of 
particularity, even if Lyotard himself is beyond suspicion 
on this count.
In the second case—or second moment—, the given, 
effective, and inventive particularity would judge the 
very Idea itself. It would not let the Idea stand—at least, 
this is a possibility—only as the Idea of particularity in 
general, but would prescribe such and such a particular-
ity. At most, or at worst, it would establish a law of its 
own particular particularity—and once again we run the 
risk of terror—, and at least, or, at best, it would disturb, 
destabilise, or set adrift the very universality of the Idea, 
and arouse the suspicion that one cannot only prescribe 
 17 Lyotard, Just Gaming, 96–7.
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a respect for particularity, that the law perhaps prescribes 
something else again, which would be neither particular 
nor universal. In other words, this second moment would 
make us ask whether the quantification of the prescrip-
tive is sufficient to guarantee its legitimacy.
What I call the ‘quantification of the prescriptive’ 
amounts to positing two possible cases of ‘judging well’: 
for Kant (according to Lyotard), it was according to the 
rule of totality; for us, it must be according to the rule of 
plurality. But there are two cases—manifested through-
out history—of response to the single question: How are 
we to judge well? How are we to judge correctly, rightly? 
We presuppose that the law can only be the law of what 
is done well, of rightness or orthotès. And this is indeed 
the horizon or ‘orthonomic’ background of Kantian law, 
in accordance with the rationale that I reconstructed ear-
lier. Transcendental judgement detaches justness from a 
determining judgement limited to the sensible condition 
of experience, and offers the unconditional form of the 
Idea as the norm of practical judgement. This uncondi-
tional form would function hypothetically as if it were 
determinant, but precisely in this case it will nonetheless 
determine its rule according to what Kant calls the type, 
namely the analogon of a schema (or the legal constitu-
tion of a phenomenon): and this type is that of a legal rec-
titude and conformity under the appearance of a nature. 
In this reasonable and moral nature we find, if not the 
actual aim that was to be reached, then at least the type 
to be imprinted on every judgement and in (or by) every 
action. We can either conceive of this nature as totality, or 
we can conceive of it as diversity and particularity.
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However, I am far from sure that Lyotard is ready to 
conceive of the ‘kingdom’ of particularity, if I may call it 
this, as a ‘nature’, if only because he attempts to conceive 
of it as language. Undoubtedly we could push our analysis 
further, and go as far as suspecting that the Lyotardian 
concept of language covers another sort of ‘nature’, that is, 
a sphere of simple orthonomy (in the plurality of ‘games’ 
and their ‘purities’). But I shall instead give him the credit 
of thinking that, through the themes of particularity, 
mobility, and the inventiveness of ‘language games’ and 
their ‘moves’, it is the specific difference between language 
and the general idea of ‘nature’ that he is calling into ques-
tion. From this point, it seems to me that he is calling 
on himself to take up his own demand in a different way. 
And therefore also to take up and play out in a different 
way his relation to Kant.
And perhaps too from the following precise point, 
which we must now consider: Lyotard actually doubly 
distances himself from Kant. First, by substituting plural-
ity in place of totality, and then by criticising Kant’s pre-
supposition of the Idea as an idea of totality, and for not 
making judgement ‘absolutely undetermined’.18 There are 
therefore two demands: one in relation to particularity, 
the other in relation to the indetermination of judgement. 
However, it is not certain that the satisfaction of the first 
demand necessarily leads to the satisfaction of the sec-
ond. It is not certain that it is enough to posit particularity 
for us to have an ‘undetermined’ judgement (that is, in 
Lyotard’s sense, a non-determining judgement, a judge-
 18 Ibid. 87. Translation modified.
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ment that does not construct and therefore does not dog-
matically impose its object: for Lyotard, totality as Idea 
and totalitarianism, or terror, are connected). This is what 
I tried to show a moment ago: particularity can function, 
in a way, as if it were a totality, by a sort of return of the as 
if mode we could call Lyotardo-Kantian . . . 
The ‘indetermination’ of judgement therefore plays out 
somewhere other than in the assignation of particularity. 
Perhaps it plays out—and this is, once again, the direc-
tion in which I think one of Lyotard’s demands leads—
less in the content of the Idea than in the status or nature 
of judgement itself. And, for this reason, it would respond 
less to the determination of the question ‘how are we to 
judge well?’ (which is ultimately the normal, orthonomic 
meaning of the question how are we to judge?) than it 
responds to the insistence of what we must call the ques-
tion of the question ‘how are we to judge?’, or the insist-
ence of the question: How does judging happen? What is 
at stake? What does judging want from us?
Only by examining the status of the judgement in ques-
tion (or that which questions us) will we perhaps be able 
to address both the difficulties and the relation to Kant—
or to discover that Lyotard’s thought involves, inadvert-
ently, a different Kant from the one that he presents most 
explicitly.
The judgement in question is reflective judgement. 
Lyotard characterises it as ‘a maximization of concepts 
outside of any knowledge of reality’.19 Kant’s text undoubt-
edly allows us to corroborate this definition in several 
 19 Ibid. 75.
Dies Irae 39
respects. It does not, perhaps, allow us to be satisfied with 
it. On this definition, reflective judgement directly pur-
sues the trajectory of determining judgement, extrapo-
lated outside the limits of possible experience. And on the 
condition of the hypothetical mode of ‘as if ’ or of ‘anal-
ogy’, this judgement would determine (how could it not?) 
an object that would no longer be an object, an Idea under 
which would be subsumed the maxims of actions, just as 
the sensible determinations of the object are subsumed 
under a concept. In both cases, the manner of obtaining 
legality would be the same (and this is also what would 
support, to a certain extent, the logic of ‘nature’ as typical 
legality).
But reflective judgement is perhaps not simply the 
extrapolated analogon of determining judgement. In this 
respect—if you will permit me a brief digression—, we 
must first recall that determining judgement, acting in the 
sole sphere of knowledge, is itself dependent, for its possi-
bility and its functioning, on ‘synthetic principles of pure 
understanding’ which, at least as far as dynamic princi-
ples are concerned (the analogies of experience and the 
postulates of empirical thought), are not ‘constitutive’ but 
‘regulatory’, and ultimately offer, over the course of Kant’s 
work, the prefiguration of reflective judgement.20 These 
principles are regulatory because they ‘are to bring the 
existence of appearances under rules a priori’; however, 
this ‘existence cannot be constructed’.21 Regulation is that 
which is concerned with existence, with the unconstruct-
 20 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 194.
 21 Ibid. 210.
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ible effectiveness of that limit-concept, which is the very 
‘concept’ of being according to which existence is not a 
predicate of the object, but rather its position in being, 
either given or non-given, happening or not. This posi-
tion in being is a position of being, or rather being itself 
as a position: this is ‘Kant’s Thesis about Being’ accord-
ing to Heidegger, a thesis that ‘belongs to that which 
remains unthought in all metaphysics’, for the presence of 
‘posited-being’ is not being (which, itself, is not), but that 
which being ‘allows to be’.22 Unconstructible existence is 
that which being allows to be, it is not necessary, it relates 
to a gift (and not to a datum) and with a becoming (and 
not with a construction). Regulation in general concerns 
a gift and a becoming (which appear here as preceding 
theoretical possibility itself). It concerns the becoming of 
a world, a fiat, but a fiat that is only an allowing-to-be. 
And the fiat may be inseparable from the dies irae, the 
creation of a world of judgement, even if we must con-
ceive of them both without God.
Reflective judgement corresponds above all to the situ-
ation in which the law is not given (and if, as I have just 
outlined, we must place the third Critique ‘before’ the first, 
that would mean that the law is never given, from any 
point of view). But this negative condition—the absence of 
construction and of a law of construction—corresponds 
to a positive condition—or at least a condition that has 
 22 See Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1998), 377, footnote n° 1, Kant's Thesis about Being 
1. Originally published in Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 
vol. iv, no. 3 (1973), pp. 7–33. Present version edited and revised by 
William McNeill, Ted E. Klein Jr., and William E. Pohl.
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the positivity of a constraint, an obligation: the obligation 
to find the law. ‘If . . . only the particular is given and 
the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement 
is simply reflective.’23 Reflective judgement must find (soll 
finden). It must invent the law, it must produce the uni-
versal by itself. But it must not produce it as a phantom, 
a fiction of an object or objectivity that would more or 
less fill in a lack in the theoretical possibilities of reason. 
Certainly, this tone or suggestion is also present in Kant’s 
text, and especially when he is warning the reader against 
the Schwärmerei that hypostatises regulatory Ideas. But 
essentially it is not fiction in this sense that does the work 
of reflective judgement. It is fiction in the strict sense of 
fabrication, the poiesis of the universal—a poiesis that 
immediately and fundamentally opens onto aesthetic 
(poietic) judgement, unless it is turned entirely, through 
this aesthetic judgement, towards a praxis.
Aesthetic judgement will then be said to have a ‘claim 
to universality’. But this claim has nothing to do with ‘pre-
tense’ in the ordinary sense of the term, that is, the arro-
gant presumption of a subjectivity. In truth, this claim to 
be valid for everyone is a tension towards, a pro-tension, 
the pro-position or the project of a universality still to be 
realised, and which is, in a way, already in action in the 
judgement that lays claim, or in the pro-position of judge-
ment. What makes this judgement non-determining is 
that there is no need to show or know this universal as an 
object. But what makes it reflective is not the substitution, 
 23 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, ed. Nicholas Walker, trans. 
James Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 15.
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by default, of a given object with the fiction or projection 
of its idea (which would then be an image; the hypotheti-
cal ‘as if ’ would be a ‘semblance’): it is the project, not 
the projection, that constitutes the ‘object’ of reflective 
judgement. And this is the project of an existence, or its 
pro-position: that is, the project of allowing-to-be—or to 
make a becoming by allowing-to-be—which cannot be 
constructed. What I shall provisionally, and rather awk-
wardly, call the regulatory ‘project’ could indeed consti-
tute a reinterpretation or a return to play of Heideggerian 
being, with its Kantian source, its openness, and its des-
tinality. If there were an ontological thesis underlying 
my argument (and, of course, there must be one . . . ), it 
would be the thesis of being as judgement. Let us stay on 
the subject of judgement for now.
The law of this judgement, then, is not a simulacrum 
of a law of nature. It is, above all, and long before it is 
applied to the auxiliaries of ‘as if ’ and of ‘type’, a law that 
the reflective faculty of judgement gives to itself. That is, a 
law for judgement, a law that tells it and impels it to judge 
universally, to make a project of a universal, that is, of a 
reason. And not, once again, to play with a fiction of rea-
son but to make a project out of reason, its own project, 
or its proposition.
For sure, all the values of the Aufklärung make them-
selves felt here, from autonomy (which Lyotard rightly 
takes issue with, and I shall return to this) to rationality 
and progress, and these values already offer themselves 
to be picked up in turn by Hegel and by the rational 
servitude of the project, in the critical sense that Bataille 
gives to this word.
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But, as you will have understood, I am not using this 
word in Bataille’s sense at all. If reflective judgement is 
a project, or creates a project, and not projection, it is 
because it casts itself beyond itself, so to speak, in the 
reality of a universe still to be made, invented, and not 
because it submits itself to the teleology of a totalising 
Idea. It is in fact, I repeat, the ‘project’ of a pro-position, a 
position of existence (that of a ‘kingdom’) that is not fic-
tively anticipated, but in the course of positing itself in and 
from the judgement itself. At least, this is how we must 
simultaneously combine and share out two necessary 
readings of Kant, which therefore now entail two neces-
sary readings of Lyotard.
The project of reflective judgement therefore remains 
undetermined. Kant states this explicitly with regard to 
the ‘ideal purposiveness of nature’: the ‘presupposition’ 
of a final union of the heterogeneous laws of nature 
remains ‘so indeterminate’24 that we are prepared to 
be satisfied with a multiplicity of laws that ultimately 
remain irreducible. This means, furthermore, since we 
are concerned here with the ‘very remarkable pleasure’ 
and ‘admiration’ connected to the discovery of a princi-
ple of union in general, that we can be ‘satisfied’ with a 
lack of pleasure, or a non-terminal pleasure—or in short, 
perhaps what Freud would come to call, both sexually 
and aesthetically, a yield of pleasure. The project is not 
simply and univocally the project of termination and 
totalisation. It is, at least, also the project of the undeter-
mined of the unbestimmt in the very determination of a 
 24 Ibid. 23.
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judgement of ends. And the Bestimmung of judgement, 
that is, its determination and destination, is the Bestim-
mung of the unbestimmt, the destination towards the 
undetermined. That is, once again, towards judgement 
itself, which ‘must find’, and must invent in an undeter-
mined and interminable way the advent of a reason. The 
Idea, in this respect, is not an Idea of reason projected in 
the guise of a fictive telos, but the Idea is the very reason 
that emerges from itself, from determining rationality, 
and which ventures to judge. Judgement is the risk of 
reason. And what it exposes itself to, necessarily, is being 
judged. For I no longer judge, here, in order to verify 
afterwards the justness of the relation that I have estab-
lished with some datum of experience, but in judging 
I venture a ‘reason’ (or an unreason) that is so judged 
by what it attempts or risks. ‘Possible experience’, in this 
case, is the very experience of this risk. Reason should 
not be measured against the model of a given univer-
sal reason. As reason, it is the chance that is taken to 
make (and to allow-to-be) a universe—and this chance 
judges it. I am judged against the measure of the world 
that I attempt, for which I try my luck, and not against 
the measure of a world that is already established. Every 
attempt is my final judgement.
(I shall add, only parenthetically, as I shall not dwell 
on it, that we must apply this same logic to understand-
ing the hypothetical mode of as if: although it is a fiction 
and, let us say, mimesis, it is not the illusory imitation of a 
universal model, but rather the mimetic poiesis, without 
model, of a universe, of the Idea of a universe or of a 
‘kingdom’. The typic of practical reason must at the very 
least be read according to the two possible directions of 
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mimesis. This brings us to a typographic complexity, and I 
yield this subject to one who is present here today *, who 
is an expert on this matter).
Two.—At the end of the first section of What Does it 
Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?, Kant writes:
But the need of reason [the need for ‘orientating our-
selves in thought—i.e. in the immeasurable space of 
the supra-sensory realm which we see as full of utter 
darkness’, as he states earlier, p. 241] can be regarded 
as twofold in character: firstly, it has a theoretical use, 
and secondly, a practical use. The first of these has 
just been mentioned [he has just been discussing 
the subjective assumption of an intelligent Creator 
of the world], but it is quite plain that it is merely 
conditional—that is, we must assume that God ex-
ists if we wish to pass judgement on the first causes 
of all contingent things, especially in the ordering 
of those purposes which are actually present in the 
world. Much more important, however, is the need 
of reason in its practical use, because this is uncondi-
tional, and because we are compelled to assume that 
God exists not only if we wish to pass judgement, but 
because we must [müssen] pass judgement. For the 
practical use of reason consists in the formulation of 
moral laws. All of these lead, however, to the idea of 
the highest good that is possible in the world, in so 
far as it is attainable by means of freedom alone—
i.e. to morality [Sittlichkeit]; and on the other hand, 
they also lead to something which depends not just 
on human freedom, but also on nature—namely the 
greatest happiness, in so far as its distribution is pro-
portionate to that of morality. Now reason needs to 
 * The reference is to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, colleague of Nancy, 
who was present at the conference ‘Comment juger? À partir de 
Jean-François Lyotard’ and  published several books about the con-
cept of typography [Editors].
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assume [the existence of] a dependent highest good 
of this kind, and for this purpose, it must also as-
sume [the existence of] a supreme intelligence as the 
highest independent good. It does so not in order 
to derive from it the binding authority of the moral 
laws or the motive for observing them – for they 
would have no moral value if the motive for obey-
ing them were derived from anything other than the 
law alone, which is apodictically certain in itself. It 
does so only in order to give objective reality to the 
concept of the highest good—i.e. to prevent the lat-
ter, along with morality [Sittlichkeit] as a whole, from 
being regarded merely as an ideal, as would be the 
case if the [being] whose idea is an inseparable ac-
companiment to morality [Moralität] did not itself 
exist.25
Practical reason therefore must judge. There is a con-
straint (a müssen and not a sollen) that is simultaneously 
the consequence of the presence of ‘certain’ law within us, 
and a sort of archi-ethical obligation, under which the 
law makes itself known. This constraint is that of reason, 
since ‘the practical use of reason consists in the formu-
lation of moral laws’. However, this pure practical use is 
not employed ad libitum and is not derived. Reason is 
practical in itself, and this is even what distinguishes it 
from theoretical reason, which is not strictly theoretical 
in itself without the vigilance of critical judgement. In 
itself, or in its Trieb, theoretical reason is associated with 
Schwärmerei. Practical reason, on the other hand, does 
not have any need of a critique (only its use has need of 
 25 Immanuel Kant, What is Orientation in Thinking?, in Political Writ-
ings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. Hugh Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 237–49 (242–3).
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a critique, as the second Critique tells us). We should not 
imagine that it has eliminated its Trieb in advance, as if 
it were a bad instinct, but rather that its Trieb, as it were, 
exists within it as a practical rather than a theoretical ele-
ment. Its Trieb leads theoretically to the positing of an 
illusory unconditional, but practically it demands a prac-
tical unconditional. What is ‘anterior’ or ‘superior’ to cri-
tique is the fact that reason is practical in itself. We could 
call this a praxis-orientated ontology that would underlie 
the whole process of critique (which we would perhaps 
have to rethink entirely, as far as ‘ontology’ is concerned, 
just as we still have to think through how the Critique of 
Pure Reason is itself a consequence of the archi-ethical 
obligation of practical reason, and how judgement on the 
theoretical obeys the practical constraint. We should, for 
example, consider this first ‘need’ of reason, identified in 
the first Critique, which is the need for transcendental 
reflection as a judgement of our faculties of knowing).26
What cannot be derived is not only ‘the authority inher-
ent in moral laws’, according to the terms of the text cited 
above, as if this authority issued directly from an absolute 
and transcendental principle, but, in a sense, the author-
ity of this authority, that is, the fact that reason is practical 
in itself. ‘Before’ the law, in essence, reason judges—and 
more than that, it is judgement. But this is also why there 
is no ‘before of the law’. As soon as there is reason, there is 
law. That does not mean that the law is rational, but rather 
that ‘reason’ signifies ‘that which is in essence subjected 
to the obligation to judge’. Not to the obligation of a law 
 26 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 276–7.
48 Dies Irae
that would pre-exist it, but to the obligation to make the 
law. Making law is the law that reason must obey. It is the 
law of the law—and which judges reason, assigning it to 
judgement.
The law is the very law of morality, that is, the actuali-
sation of judgement in freedom. It is the law that I freely 
carry out the law. This is the highest good. It is not an 
ideal: it is the idea of a nature in which the ‘happiness’ of 
freedom is actualised. It is the project of this actualisa-
tion, or the pro-position of it. A nature of this sort is a 
‘dependent highest good’: it requires the guarantee of a 
God who allows nature to be compatible with freedom—
a God who allows the very project of judgement. This is 
the idea. It does not make us know anything, but paradox-
ically this is how it grants ‘objective reality’ to the moral 
project. What, then, is this strange objective reality? 
Considered as a quasi-object, or as a fiction intended to 
stimulate morality, it would be both theoretically useless 
(there is no ‘quasi-object’) and practically weak (it would 
transform the categorical imperative into a hypothetical 
one). It would ruin Kantian logic itself (for example, by 
this same reading Nietzsche accused Kant of having shut 
again the cage of morality, after having opened it).27 But 
this is precisely why this ‘objective reality’ must be con-
sidered strictly for what it is: it is a practical reality, not 
quasi-theoretical or fictive; it is not, perhaps, what Lyo-
tard calls a ‘maximization of the concept’ (unless by ‘max-
imization’ Lyotard had meant the ‘becoming-a-maxim’ of 
 27 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. 
Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), §335, 188.
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the concept . . . ). A practical objective reality means the 
reality of duty. Morality must be, and freedom must be 
actualised in the world. ‘The concept of freedom is meant 
to actualize in the sensible world the end imposed by its 
laws.’28
God, then, is not an ideal; he has the reality of duty, and 
he has only this reality (many texts in the Opus Postu-
mum, in particular, confirm this proposition). This does 
not even mean that duty is a God for Kant. Undoubt-
edly, he comes close (especially in the Opus Postumum) 
to the internalisation and the subjectivisation of God, 
and the transformation of theology into anthropology, 
which would lead to the accomplishment of the death of 
God. But Kant is neither a theologian nor a murderer of 
God (which, as it happens, amounts to the same thing). 
He simply leaves God to Himself, and man to his duty. 
The claim that morality must be therefore means first of 
all that duty, which cannot be derived, is first the duty to 
name and put into action the objective reality of freedom. 
I cannot dwell here on the connection between ‘naming’ 
and ‘putting into action’, and on what is undoubtedly at 
stake in the name and naming in general, in normative 
performation (can the name of freedom be anything 
other than the name of a free being, for example? And 
can the name of God be such a name? I shall leave these 
questions to one side). Above all, I wish to emphasise 
this: the Idea is not the subjective ‘Idea’ of a reality whose 
objectivity would be eternally unverifiable; the Idea has, 
and is the practical objective reality of freedom. That is, of 
 28 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 12.
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duty. In practical usage, we must posit the Idea, because 
we must judge.
In other words, we do not judge without Idea. Not in 
the sense that we need an idea—a criterion—in order to 
judge. But firstly, and fundamentally, in the sense that the 
Idea is the duty to judge, to the extent that this duty is 
nothing if not the practical objective reality of freedom 
taking action. Duty is not the text of an obligation, dis-
played or archived somewhere in the offices of reason. 
Duty is the being of reason, in that it is practical in itself, 
and in that reason itself incessantly proclaims: lyo tar, 
‘I judge, know it!’ This amounts to constantly submit-
ting itself to the tribunal of freedom, that is, to expos-
ing itself to the last judgement, to the final judgement of 
freedom. This judgement does not consist in what Sartre 
called being ‘condemned to freedom’. First, because the 
freedom in question here is not the same as Sartre’s. But 
especially because it is not a question of condemnation; it 
is a question of what exposes, yields, or abandons reason 
to the law, before and independently of any punishment 
or reward.
To the extent that reason, as a practice, is judged by the 
duty to judge which brings it into being, it is first judged 
in that it experiences an interest for the law, and a ‘feeling 
of pleasure . . . in the fulfilment of duty’, as Kant claims in 
the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals.29 Within the factum rationis of morality, this 
unconstructible and underivable factum that is noth-
ing other than the being-in-practice of reason, we also 
 29 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 64.
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find the fact that man ‘does really take an interest’ in the 
law30—and Kant states later on that this interest consti-
tutes an originary interest of reason.31 I am therefore, as 
it were, exposed or delivered to a pleasure of duty, and 
this is how I must judge. The ‘lyo tar’ would in effect be 
the ego sum of a being of pleasure (a matter of holding 
on to something of the libidinal), devoted to the law of 
the pleasure of the law. However, this ‘originary’ pleasure 
is absolutely incomprehensible: ‘it is quite impossible to 
see, that is, to make comprehensible a priori, how a mere 
thought which itself contains nothing sensible produces 
a feeling of pleasure or displeasure.’32 Whether or not 
pleasure is comprehensible in general is a question that 
we must put to Kant, since ‘pleasure and displeasure . . . 
[contribute] nothing to knowledge’,33 and also because it 
is uniquely the relation to pleasure and displeasure that 
constitutes ‘the enigma in the faculty of judgement’34 and 
demands to be treated by critique as a distinct entity. I 
shall leave this question open. In any case, if the pleas-
ure of the law were comprehensible, it would immedi-
ately produce a condition, in the form of ‘some interest 
laid down as a basis’, and then the law ‘would not be the 
moral law, that is, the supreme law of freedom’.35 The 
law of freedom is unconditional, the pleasure of the law 
is unconditioning, but we take pleasure precisely in the 
 30 Ibid. 63–4.
 31 Ibid. 65.
 32 Ibid. 64.
 33 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 36.
 34 Ibid. 5.
 35 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 66.
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unconditional nature of the law, in an originary and nec-
essarily incomprehensible way.
However, this brings with it the following implication: 
just as pleasure cannot condition the execution of the 
law, the law is no more capable of governing pleasure. 
Kant writes in the third Critique, as if he were answering 
Lacan in advance: ‘An obligation to enjoyment is a patent 
absurdity. And the same, then, must also be said of a sup-
posed obligation to actions that have merely enjoyment 
for their aim, no matter how spiritually this enjoyment 
may be refined in thought (or embellished), and even 
if it be a mystical, so-called heavenly, enjoyment.’36 The 
law is not pleasurable, and pleasure is not obligatory: the 
pleasure of the law is, in the law itself, in excess of the 
obliging nature of the law. But that does not mean that it 
goes beyond obligation, as is the case in the consequence 
of submission to a conditioned constraint (by submit-
ting myself to the condition, I obtain satisfaction), on the 
contrary, it means that its ‘excess’ resides in obligation, 
or in the fact of being-absolutely-obliged itself. The law 
is the pleasure of reason through an incentive that is not 
a condition. That is to say, if I may be permitted a play 
on words, that the law is the very mobility (mobilité)37 
of reason, and its enjoyment [jouissance]. Judgement 
according to the law is the jouissance of pure practical 
reason—which is practical in itself precisely because it 
is enjoyed in this way. But it takes jouissance in noth-
 36 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 40 n. 3.
 37 [Translator’s note: The term in the French text is ‘mobilité’, com-
bining the meanings of the English words ‘mobility’ and ‘incentive’ 
(‘mobile’ in French).]
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ing but the law, and the law does not allow itself to be 
appropriated. It is not enjoyment that defines the law, but 
rather the inverse—and from this point enjoyment is not 
defined as ‘enjoyment of . . . ’, but as the exposure—in the 
strict sense—of reason to its own impossibility of giving 
a reason for its being-practical, that is, to the impossibil-
ity of making the law pleasurable and pleasure obligatory. 
This exposure takes the following form, in the last lines of 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: ‘we do not 
indeed comprehend the practical unconditional necessity 
of the moral imperative, but we nevertheless comprehend 
its incomprehensibility; and this is all that can fairly be 
required of a philosophy that strives in its principles to 
the very boundary of human reason.’38
The two questions, why we judge and how we are to 
judge, are perhaps not as separate as Lyotard suggests 
(even though, in another way, he also suggests the oppo-
site, such that we might well ask him if the underivable 
fact of the plurality of language games, in whose name 
he eliminates the ‘why’,39 would not occupy in its own 
way the position of ‘jouissance’ that I have just been 
discussing). If the incentive of practical reason is not to 
be found in any satisfaction, but in the exposure to the 
uncontrollable ‘mobility’ of its freedom, it is because we 
must always judge while exposing ourselves to this free-
dom. We must judge in such a way that the very law of 
freedom will always be left over or in excess in relation 
to that which my judgement has been able to determine, 
 38 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 66.
 39 Lyotard, Just Gaming, 49–50.
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and in relation to that which has been able to determine 
it. This is undoubtedly the meaning of the third formula 
of the imperative: the human person as an end (if we do 
not forget that the person is the character of a practical 
reasonable being that is intelligible to itself) is the other 
who cannot, as a person, offer me a pleasure that would 
condition my judgement, and it is the other whom I can-
not oblige to feel pleasure. We must judge in such a way 
that the law, in the other and of the other, judges at the 
same moment my own judgement. The last judgement is 
also this judgement of the other that is the end, but the 
other as an end is the law itself.
Three.—‘The effect of the moral law as incentive is only 
negative’,40 states the second Critique, precisely because all 
it does is to expose to me the impossibility of my appro-
priating, as it were, the ‘mobility’ of this mobilising force. 
It does not offer me a good in the capitalisable sense of the 
term. On the contrary, the law as incentive ‘strikes down 
my pride’41 by revealing to me that there can be no per-
fect good in me. Pleasure, therefore, is not in this case 
the principle of desire: this is the whole hypothesis of the 
second Critique, as set out in its preface. It is, rather, the 
law that is the principle of desire, since it is law of free-
dom. However, the faculty of desiring ‘is a being’s faculty 
to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality 
 40 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason [1781], trans. Mary 
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 61. 
[Gregor’s translation ‘incentive’ keeps the Kantian sense of Trieb-
feder as elater animi, but it cannot render the French relation mo-
bile/mobility.]
 41 Ibid. 64.
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of the objects of these representations’.42 As for freedom 
itself, if we maintain its transcendental definition, it is 
‘an absolute spontaneity of the cause, whereby a series of 
appearances, which proceeds in accordance with laws of 
nature, begins of itself’.43 The faculty of desiring mobilised 
by freedom is therefore the faculty to be, by one’s own 
representations, the cause of the beginning of a series of 
appearances which would be the real objects of these rep-
resentations: in other words, the faculty to begin a world. 
This means that freedom is nothing other than the faculty 
of desiring considered with regard to such a beginning, 
that is, without external and natural support for the rep-
resentations that, as representations of freedom (in both 
senses of the genitive), will be the cause of the reality of 
a beginning. Freedom is desire with the absolute power 
of beginning. (We can put it this way at least for the time 
being. For a beginning is undoubtedly never absolute. It 
is not an origin. It takes place in time and in accordance 
with a rupture in the causal sequence. We shall come back 
to this point later.)
We are poised here on the very sharpest crest—in 
German, die Kante—of the edifice of Kant’s work (which 
is, precisely, not an edifice, but only its ‘plan’,44 or indeed 
its project, the project for a philosophical judgement 
and for a judgement of philosophy). If freedom is desire 
with the absolute power of beginning, and if the law of 
freedom is the unique incentive of the desire to judge, 
then absolute desire is the incentive of desire. The eras-
 42 Ibid. 7.
 43 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 411.
 44 Ibid. 573.
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ure of all incentive for pleasure in incomprehensibility 
liberates all at once, at least in principle, the great figure 
or modern structure of the desire for desire, of the will 
towards will, and this absolute sovereignty of subjectiv-
ity that, from Sade to a certain Nietzsche, makes the 
object of law—as Lacan says in his Kant with Sade—no 
longer a universal law that would be only a thing-in-
itself, but the Dasein of the ‘I’ that enjoys [jouit].45 Tak-
ing account of this and still in accordance with Lacan, 
this Dasein, which is not the effective existence of some-
one experiencing jouissance but the point of emission of 
the maxim, entrusts this emission to the voices heard by 
President Schreber . . . We should add: the emission of 
the maxims of all totalitarianisms—using this term in its 
conventional sense. The will towards will engenders the 
law as delirium.
But Kantian desire, even if it opens up this possibility 
on one side of the crest, on the other side slips away from 
the modern deployment of the infinitely autotelic nature 
of desire. That is, it also slips away, in general, from the 
autonomy that Lyotard rightly rejects in Kant’s work. It is 
not a self-producing and autotelic desire (or will): meas-
ured against the desire of modern subjectivity, it is a dis-
eased desire. But this disease of desire perhaps creates 
the opportunity for a freedom that is, once again, not the 
autonomy of will. The desire of the law is ultimately not 
 45 Jacques Lacan, ‘Kant with Sade’ (1963), in Écrits: The First Com-
plete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with 
Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 2006), 645–68 
(650–1).
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auto-mobile, self-mobilising (that is, both self-sufficient 
and mechanical) and it does not convert itself into a law 
of desire, because its incentive, the law, escapes it just as 
surely as it is made only of itself. Once again, this formu-
lation is very insufficient, and would simply lead to the 
dialectical negative inscribed in principle in auto-mobile 
desire: to the representation of desire (or of freedom) 
that is infinitely spoiled both in itself and in the flight of 
its object. However, this representation is still jouissance, 
and even the form of jouissance for modern thought, 
from Romanticism to Lacan. But all autonomous repre-
sentation that issues from its own autonomy falls short 
of the faculty of desire that must begin a series of events, 
or in other words, that must judge. The representation 
of jouissance falls short, or again: the representation and 
its jouissance fall short, which also means that there is 
a lack of this representation or presentation of jouis-
sance as lack, or as lacking, which provides the dialecti-
cal resource of auto-mobile desire. In very general terms, 
Kant’s achievement perhaps lies in having proposed that 
we should consider desire—that desire inscribed at the 
foundation of metaphysics and subjectivity—as duty. 
That is, not to make duty into a desire, nor desire into 
a duty, but to substitute, at the very site of a teleologi-
cal mobilisation of the subject (appetite, will, conatus, or 
desire), a praxis of reason in place of a dialectic of con-
sciousness.
And so, ‘the feeling that arises from consciousness 
of this necessitation [of the law] . . . , as submission to a 
law, that is, as a command (indicating constraint for the 
sensibly affected subject) . . . therefore contains in it no 
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pleasure but instead, so far, displeasure in the action.’46 
Clearly, since there is no pleasure, it is not a question 
of masochism; and no less clearly, since there is also no 
pleasure for the law that commands, it is not a question of 
sadism. Certainly, as we have seen, there must be a pleas-
ure—one that is incomprehensible. But regarding this 
pleasure, of which we know nothing, we know at least, 
with the greatest certainty, that it is not the pleasure of 
displeasure. We know this not only by the whole structure 
that we have been examining, but also by Kant’s consid-
eration of pleasure in general: ‘Gratification (no mat-
ter whether its cause has its seat even in ideas) appears 
always to consist in a feeling of the furtherance of the 
entire life of human beings and, hence also of their bod-
ily well-being, i.e. their health. And so, perhaps, Epicurus 
was not wide of the mark when he said that at bottom all 
pleasure is bodily sensation.’47 This comment is found at 
the beginning of the long ‘remark’ on laughter that con-
cludes the ‘Analytic of the Sublime’.
The imperative of the law is without pleasure as an 
imperative (and yet there is not the law plus the impera-
tive, but rather it is the imperative that is and enacts the 
law). It is without pleasure, and it is (therefore) impera-
tive, because ‘pleasure is the representation of the agree-
ment of an object or of an action with the subjective 
conditions of life, i.e. with the faculty of the causality of a 
representation with respect to the reality of its object’48—
 46 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 67.
 47 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 159.
 48 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 7.
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and consequently, with the faculty of desiring. However, 
this agreement of the object or the action with desire or 
freedom must be—this is the objective practical reality of 
the Idea—but it is not given. The representation attached 
to the imperative is that of this must-be of the agreement, 
not of the agreement itself. The faculty in relation to the 
reality is not given and is not guaranteed. If it were, there 
would no longer be duty—and there would no longer be 
any risk nor chance of judgement.
So is the desire for law a vain one? Is this splendid risk 
of the judgement of freedom simply an ineffective illu-
sion, and can it be reduced to ineffective intention? There 
is no need for me to take up again those well-known texts 
in which Kant anticipates and vigorously opposes the 
trap of a morality of intention (which would ultimately 
be no more than a soothing and saccharine version of 
the modern psychosis of desire). These texts can also be 
illuminated by Kant’s discussion of a related criticism: 
that of creating a confusion, in his definition of desire, 
between desire and a powerless wish. This discussion 
undoubtedly presents, in an anthropological form, what 
is at stake in the praxis-ontology of freedom. Far from 
defending a firm distinction between desire and the wish, 
Kant endorses illusory desires, not because they are illu-
sory, but as ‘a beneficent disposition in our nature’ which 
‘regenerate[s] the activity of the human being, so that he 
does not lose the feeling of life’, while making us aware 
of our own power; for ‘it would seem that were we not 
to be determined to the exertion of our power before 
we had assured ourselves of the efficiency of our faculty 
for producing an object, our power would remain to a 
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large extent unused. For as a rule we only first learn to 
know our powers by making trial of them.’49 Let us add: 
freedom, all the more so, cannot be known, and can be 
‘known’ only by our ‘making trial’ of it. The desire for the 
law is not a vain desire, but it shares in common with vain 
desire the fact that it cannot be guaranteed in advance of 
its own power to realise a judgement. It is therefore first 
of all an intensification of the feeling of the practical life 
of reason—of the feeling of duty—and the attempt (the 
project is an attempt) at a judgement which should not 
be measured against empirical and theoretical possibil-
ity, but rather against the ‘impossibility’ of freedom. For 
example, against the ‘impossibility’ of a reasonable com-
munity.
The analogy with the wish ends here. In the wish, ‘the 
mind is allowed continually to relapse and become lan-
guid upon recognition of the impossibility before it’.50 But 
this cannot be the case for judgement, which, as a judge-
ment that must make a decision about a beginning of free-
dom, is not initially concerned with an ending, but in its 
decision, as judgement, has already entered the kingdom 
of freedom. The desire of the law is always confronted 
with the ‘impossibility’ of the law. But this ‘impossibility’ 
is also that which, in reality, takes place when we judge. 
The kingdom of ends begins with each judgement (but it 
remains true, if this needs repeating, that both judgement 
 49 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 14, and Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View, ed. and trans. Robert Louden (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006), 175.
 50 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 13–14 n.1.
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and beginning only have meaning when everything pos-
sible is done to reach an ending).
Four.—Reflective judgement is regulatory. What, in gen-
eral, is the rule? The rule is a non-constitutive principle. 
That does not mean a vague or approximate principle. 
Rules are not distinguished from constitutive principles 
‘in certainty—both have a certain a priori—but in the 
nature of their evidence, that is, as regards the character 
of the intuitive . . . factors peculiar to the latter’.51 The rule 
is a principle deprived of the intuition of its object. For 
example, the first of all rules, in the order in which they 
are set out in the Critique, and which is also in a way the 
rule of rules, is the rule of causality, which first appears at 
the very beginning of the ‘Transcendental Deduction of 
the Categories’ and is fully explained in the second of the 
‘Analogies of Experience’: I must be able to connect that 
which occurs to a cause that precedes it, but it is impos-
sible for me to have the intuition of causality itself, that is, 
of the efficiency with which that which occurs would be 
the product of the cause. There is no intuition of causation 
as such, and for example, and peculiarly, there is no intui-
tion of what it might be to produce a world (to create), or 
what it might be to cause the reality of the object of my 
representation.
Reflective judgement does not see what it produces as a 
rule. If I judge that the maxim of my action can make uni-
versal law (for this is the real practical judgement: it is not 
directly a universal judgement, but it is a judgement that 
 51 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 211.
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my maxim can become a universal law), I do not judge 
according to a universal that I would have seen, but nor 
do I judge blindly, I judge on the universal, or in other 
words, I make a decision about it. I make a decision about 
the universum. And for this reason the particular nature 
of the rule is not to be found in it its lack of vision, or its 
vision by default, but rather in an entirely different vision, 
which would be the vision of this ‘decision’.
In the Opus Postumum, Kant reproduces this maxim 
of Lichtenberg’s: ‘He who would know the world must first 
manufacture it—in his own self, indeed.’52 And in the sur-
rounding pages, the world, or the universum, universitas 
rerum, is the theme of a reflection on its construction, 
which is related to the demand of practical reason. For 
example:
A Kosmotheoros who creates the elements of knowl-
edge of the world himself, a priori, from which he, at 
the same time, an inhabitant of the world, constructs 
a world-vision [Weltbeschauung] in the idea. . . It is 
necessary in practical reason’s doctrine of purposes 
to proceed not from parts to the whole, but analyti-
cally, from the idea of the whole to the parts.53
Insofar as we must undoubtedly interpret this fragment 
in the context of a slippage from transcendental idealism 
towards speculative idealism (this is the central problem 
addressed in the Opus Postumum), it illuminates a con-
 52 Kant, Opus Postumum, ed. Eckart Förster, trans. Eckart Förster and 
Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
240; Lichtenberg, Vermischte Schriften nach dessen Tode aus den 
hinterlassenen Papieren, 64–6.
 53 Ibid. 235.
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trario the rigorous critical position: the position according 
to which there is no Kosmotheoros, and no manufactur-
ing of the world, if the manufacture, in the strict sense of 
the Critique, is the mathematical process that constructs 
the concept by presenting the corresponding intuition. If 
practical reason is not a Kosmotheoros, then it has instead 
the Ideal of being a Cosmopolitès, a citizen of the world, 
which is also the characteristic of the Kosmotheoros, ‘an 
inhabitant of the world’. But the Cosmopolitès does not act 
as if he were a Kosmotheoros; he does not idly muse that 
he has created a world. He is, one might say, the practi-
cal Kosmotheoros, who does not construct the world but 
makes a decision about it, who judges it according to the 
rule of what we might call the inhabitation of the world. 
This rule is not the application of an Idea that is already 
given, whether or not this Idea is accessible to human fac-
ulties. But it is the rule of the formation of the Idea, or the 
rule of the Idea of the formation of a cosmopoliteia, which 
is nothing like a kosmotheoria. The Idea is not, despite 
its name, an Idea that can be seen. It is rather, inasmuch 
as it is a visible Idea, constantly in statu nascendi in the 
rule. It is born of judgement—each judgement is always 
a new birth of the Idea. It is not given, nor constructed, 
it comes, it arrives in judgement. The inhabitation of the 
world (which is also, as it were, the Idea of a construction) 
is itself something that arrives. This does not mean that 
it will be accomplished within a certain period of time, 
but rather, and in conformity with the rule of causality: 
the inhabitation of the world arrives and can only arrive 
through a free causality, which is that of judgement. (Or 
to put it yet another way: if we do not judge, and if we do 
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not judge according to freedom, if the Idea of freedom 
does not judge within us and does not judge us, we will 
not inhabit the world.)
What I called the project of judgement is therefore 
determined more precisely, and with a greater distinction 
from ‘projection’. The project of judgement is that, as a 
maxim of action, it makes the inhabitation of the world 
arrive. It pro-poses this habitation. That is, to borrow a 
very felicitous turn of phrase from Guillermit, that we 
must find ‘in the sphere of practical knowledge, in the 
form of an unimpeachable—that is, unconditionally nec-
essary—task (Aufgabe), the positive signification that an 
inevitable and natural illusion attempted in vain to assign 
to a theoretical problem (Aufgabe), one that is insoluble 
in the sphere of speculative knowledge’.54 The task is, in 
essence, the practical conversion of theoretical ‘impossi-
bility’; it is the practical objective reality of duty (Aufgabe 
is also the German term for what we call the duty of a 
school pupil’s ‘homework’). Judgement is a task both in 
that it is an obligation and in that it has the task of bring-
ing about the arrival of a world, and the inhabitation and 
citizenship of a world.
However, the task should not be understood in its labo-
rious value (although it is inevitably difficult), nor in its 
productive value (even though it also involves a poiesis). 
Certainly it can and must involve working, operating, 
bringing to fruition, taking responsibility, even militat-
ing. But the task as such designates the judgement that is 
 54 Louis Guillermit, ‘Les Trois espèces de l’apparence’, Bulletin de la 
Société française de philosophie, 75.4 (1981), 111–26 (125).
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assumed: the Latin word taxare, from which the word task 
is derived as well as ‘to tax’,55 means to estimate, evaluate. 
And ‘to take up the task’ is to assume responsibility for an 
evaluation, take it or receive it as an obligation. For exam-
ple, this is the meaning employed by Lyotard in his video 
with Guiffrey: ‘It is clear that painting, since Cezanne at 
least, was indeed given the task of presenting that there is 
something unpresentable’. . .56
The rule is therefore the rule of a task, the principle of a 
task, and not the principle of an object or a substance. The 
principle of a task is not a principle in the sense of a foun-
dation or an archè. It is not the beginning (the task itself 
must be the task of a beginning, an inauguration), it is the 
bidding of the task: ‘Act . . . !’ If the world—the ‘inhab-
ited’ world—were made visible to intuition—as a triangle 
may be—it would also reveal its principle or its founda-
tion, and then there would be neither task nor imperative. 
But such a world as this, made visible to intuition, would 
nonetheless presuppose the judgement that would have 
made a decision about its concept. Concepts are always 
predicates of possible judgements, and this is why, as is 
set out in the same passage of the ‘Analytic of Concepts’, 
‘the understanding may therefore be represented as a fac-
 55 [Translator’s note: the French term ‘tâche’ (used in the original 
French text) and the English term ‘task’ share a common root in the 
Latin verb ‘taxare’.]
 56 Jean-François Lyotard, Video Conversation Guiffrey / Lyotard on the 
Colour White, the Line and the Unpresentable (Fragments) (Studio 
of the artist, 1982), in Writings on Contemporary Art and Artists / 
Écrits sur l’art contemporain et les artistes, vol. IVb, Textes disperses 
II: Artistes contemporains / Miscellaneous Texts II: Contemporary 
Artists, ed. Herman Parret, trans. Vlad Ionescu, Erica Harris, and 
Peter Milne (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011), 163.
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ulty of judgement’.57 From this position, there would have 
been judgement, and the task of creating this world would 
have been incumbent on a freedom. The situation of hav-
ing to judge is well and truly a situation of principle.—
In an analogous way, Ernst Bloch analyses judgement as 
being necessarily presupposed by the concept, and not 
the opposite, in order to inscribe this judgement in the 
order of becoming, of the possible, of growth and inven-
tion, whose reason is ‘the enigma that is still, for itself, 
the being of the world in its totality.’58 In this respect, 
and in the terms and the pathos peculiar to Bloch, the 
final judgement, that of the ‘apocalypse, that is, the com-
ing in intention of a new sky and a new land’, must be 
understood ‘as the irruption, at last, of the real genesis: at 
the end, and not at the beginning of the world’.59 The last 
judgement is the final judgement and task of a beginning, 
a bringing-into-the-world of the world. And this is why, 
as Kant writes, ‘pleasure in the morally good is no doubt 
necessarily bound up with an interest, but not with one 
of the kind that are antecedent to the judgement upon 
the delight, but with one that judgement itself for the first 
time calls into existence.’60
Such is the rule. But, if the object of the rule—the end 
or the birth—cannot, by definition, since it is a task, be 
 57 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 106.
 58 Ernst Bloch, Experimentum mundi: Question, catégories de 
l’élaboration, praxis, trans. Gérard Raulet (Paris: Payot, 1982), 219. 
This reference does not imply any endorsement of the general the-
ses put forward by Bloch, only that, on this point, he extends the 
thought of Kant.
 59 Ibid. 219.
 60 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 181.
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seen, the rule itself must then make something be ‘seen’ 
one way or another. So what does the rule make visible, 
and what sort of ‘seeing’ is involved?
This is precisely the question at the centre of the essen-
tial moment of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant—at 
least in the Kantbuch—, that is, the analysis of the sche-
matism and the way it reveals the fundamental role of 
transcendental imagination. I shall not repeat this analy-
sis, nor shall I assume it is beyond discussion—but this 
is not our immediate problem. I shall draw from it only 
what is necessary for understanding the rule, and which 
is quite separate from the points that, for my own part, I 
would wish to dispute or alter in the analysis as a whole.
The rule is that which predetermines, or more precisely 
pre-designs (vorzeichnet) ‘how something in general 
must appear’, such as a house (by chance, we are con-
cerned once again with habitation), ‘in order to be able, 
as a house, to offer the appropriate look [Anblick]’.61 This 
design (Auszeichnen)—which is found in the structural 
position of the scheme as non-sensible image and as 
‘monogram, of pure a priori imagination’62—results from 
the determination, according to the rule, of the inser-
tion of the concept in a possible view. The rule rules on 
how the house-concept must be inscribed or designed 
(Hineinzeichnen) in a possible view of an empirical house. 
The rule also makes something ‘be seen’, both the Vor- 
and the Hinein-zeichnen, the prescription and inscription 
of the concept. It is not a question here of an ‘immedi-
 61 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. 
Richard Taft (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 67.
 62 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 183.
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ate, intuitive view of a concept (immittelbaren anschauli-
chen Anblick des Begriffes)’: when it comes to the concept, 
there can never be such a view as this. However, since it 
is a ‘view’, it is necessarily an ‘immediate view’ (‘view’ is 
used here to translate Anblick, that is, the sort of view that 
we see, for example, on a postcard). And so this ‘imme-
diate view is not meant [gemeint] in a strictly thematic 
way, but appears as the possible object of the presenta-
tion whose mode of regulation is represented. The rule is 
made manifest in the empirical view precisely according 
to the mode of its regulation (an unmittelbarem Anblick 
notwendig mit vorkommt, ist nicht eigens thematisch 
gemeint, sondern als mögliches Darstellbares der Darstel-
lung, deren Regelungsweise vorgestellt wird. So kommt im 
empirischen Anblick gerade die Regel in der Weise ihrer 
Regelung zum Vorschein).’63 The rule is therefore the rule 
of the presentable, the regulation of the presentability of 
the presentable in a presentation. The view that it pro-
duces is not ‘strictly thematic’, that is, it is not a view of the 
object, of the presentation of the present object, but of its 
presentability as this object—the house, a house.
Already at this stage we could say that all regulatory 
functioning obeys this logic. Regulation is never con-
cerned with the given, the present (whether empirical or 
ideal), and nor is it concerned with an unpresentable, an 
Idea that is forever inaccessible and for which we form a 
fictive substitute. It is concerned with the presentability 
of something in the event that the sensible conditions 
 63 [Translator’s note: As the French and English translations of 
Heidegger’s German text diverge substantially, we have cho-
sen here to translate the French text used by the author. See also 
Heidegger (1991).]
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are such that this thing has to be presented, in the event 
that it happens that this thing is presented, in the event 
that an existence happens to occur. The rule makes vis-
ible how, if it so happens that there is a house, it must be 
in order to be a house. It is not the thematic view of an 
object, it is the a-thematic ‘view’ of that which the object 
must obey. This ‘duty’ is also the only possibility if it is 
actually to come to pass that there is a house. But it is 
not an essence that precedes or founds an existence. It is 
the ‘essence’ of existence, that which makes it be by let-
ting it be what it must be, its end or its destination. For 
example, inhabitation, domestic or economic inhabita-
tion, or indeed cosmopolitical inhabitation. Heidegger 
then writes: 
If what is thematically represented [that is, the ‘de-
sign’] is neither the empirical look nor the isolated 
concept, but is rather the ‘listing’ [Verzeichnis] of the 
rule governing the providing of the image [Bildbe-
schaffung], then this also requires further charac-
terization. The rule is represented in the ‘How’ of 
its regulating, i.e. according to how it regulates the 
presentation dictated [taking account of the double 
meaning of the word diktieren that means ‘to dictate’ 
and ‘to impose’] within the presenting look. The rep-
resenting of the ‘How’ is the free ‘imaging’ [Bilden, 
‘to form, build’] of a making-sensible as the provid-
ing of an image in the sense just characterized, an 
imaging which is not bound to a determinate some-
thing at hand.64
The rule is therefore the rule of a free Bilden, it is the 
principle of that which is not subjected to any principle 
nor bound to any given presence. The rule is the principle 
 64 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 68.
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when nothing is given, and what it makes visible is the 
possibility that something might be given, somewhere in 
the world or as world. This possibility, this presentability 
(this ‘givability’), is not made visible by the rule—either in 
its preliminary design or in its monogram—in the same 
way that an object is made visible, for the monogram is 
not an object and is nowhere other than in the rule. And 
so there is no thematic view. But the rule ‘dictates’ and 
imposes the monogram ‘in’ the view (hineindiktiert).
The monogram is defined elsewhere as ‘a mere set of 
particular qualities . . . forming rather a blurred sketch’.65 
It is therefore close to the Idea when it is specified as a nor-
mal idea with regard to the Ideal of beauty: the Normalidee 
is ‘something intermediate between all singular intuitions 
of individuals, with their manifold variations—a floating 
image (das schwebende Bild) for the whole genus’.66 It is 
therefore ‘not derived from proportions taken from expe-
rience as determinate rules: rather it is according to this 
idea that rules for judging first become possible. . . . It 
is, as the famous Doryphorus of Polycletus was called, the 
rule’, which Kant insists is not ‘the complete archetype of 
beauty in the genus’.67 The normal idea is normative, but 
not based on an archetype to be reproduced. Rather, it 
offers an archetype for a completion, which is itself aban-
doned to the genius of the artist. A ‘complete archetype’ 
would simply be a model. The rule is both more and less 
than this—a sort of fluttering (battement) of the model.
 65 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 487.
 66 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 65.
 67 Ibid. 65.
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The rule dictates the monogram. It dictates it as one 
dictates an order. It dictates, it is dictated, in fact, because 
the unity of the concept, which it represents or which it 
brings about, does not have value here as the completed 
thematic unity of a given presence, but, as Heidegger says, 
it has value ‘in that it is unifying’, in that its unity is the 
task of a bringing-into-the-world of an image. The rule 
prescribes the concept as a task, the task of bilden. The 
rule, then, is by nature imperative even before it is the 
rule of a moral imperative. And the categorical impera-
tive is perhaps nothing other than the imperative of cat-
egory in general, the imperative of the concept, since the 
concept, as unifying rule, cannot present the unity of an 
object but only order it. (As for this unity itself, we should 
not rush to conceive of it as a totality, in the sense that 
totality would exclude multiplicity. A view of the rule of 
the house leaves the field open for the diversity of archi-
tectural conceptions and, inversely, there are several 
abodes in the house of the father.)
To the extent that the rule is independent of the datum, 
its dictation is also the gift of the possibility of a represen-
tation. In section 22, Heidegger recognises time as that 
which ‘as pure intuition . . . procure[s] a look [view] prior 
to all experience’, in line with Kant himself, whom he 
cites: ‘the pure image . . . of all objects of sense in general 
. . . [is] time.’68 Time is therefore, for the pure concepts 
of understanding, ‘their sole, pure possibility of having 
a certain look [view] [Anblicksmöglichkeit]. This unique 
possibility of having a certain look [view] shows itself in 
 68 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 73.
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itself to be nothing other than always just time and the 
temporal’69—and this to the extent that time is ‘pure self-
giving’.70 The rule is therefore originally concerned with 
time, that is, with the gift according to which something 
occurs in general. Judgement according to the rule is not 
a judgement in time, but a judgement according to time, 
or even the judgement of time, which dictates that that 
(the concept, Idea) must occur, must be brought-into-
the-world. For that to occur is strictly the end of time, 
inscribed at each moment as the rule of judgement.
This is also why, when Heidegger, in section 30, con-
nects practical reason with transcendental imagination, 
his analysis implicitly relates to the logic of the rule. In 
respect, there is a revelation of receptivity as submission 
and abandonment to Faith, and also of spontaneity as ‘the 
free self-affecting of the law’.71 This double structure is 
that of the imagination, which is receptive to the view and 
the given which, at the same time, it bildet and dictates 
itself. Therefore, concludes Heidegger, we can understand 
why, ‘in respect, the law as much as the acting self is not 
to be apprehended objectively. Rather, both are manifest 
precisely in a more original, unobjective, and unthematic 
way as duty and action, and they form the unreflected, 
acting Being of the self [Selbst-sein].’72 Once again there is 
a correspondence between the unthematic nature of the 
law and duty: the inobjectivity of the preliminary design 
 69 Ibid. 74.
 70 Ibid. 76.
 71 Ibid. 112.
 72 Ibid.
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implicates it as being prescribed. And, reciprocally, the 
only possible status of an imperative, at least for a cat-
egorical imperative—this a priori synthesis of affected 
will and pure will, as described in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals73—is an unthematic status, both 
with regard to its object (the presentability of the Idea) 
and its subject: who dictates the law? This subject can-
not be presented more than its object. In truth, it is not a 
subject, nor I, nor God, who dictates, but the essence of 
the law is to be always only dictated. Its being is a being-
dictated, in relation to which the thematic question of the 
subject has no relevance. That which dictates it is pre-
cisely the injunction that it should dictate. It dictates, at 
every moment, the end of time. (For the same reasons, 
the imperative is indeed an obligation, but not a con-
straint; it demands, it does not force, since it is deprived 
of any means of execution; it does not have the nature of 
what is known by the name of ‘commanding’. Freedom 
could not be commanded—but it is imperative.)
Five.—It is the imperative that designates the kingdom 
of ends, rather than the other way around. The kingdom 
of ends is not a final kingdom (in the sense, for example, 
of the ‘final struggle’). It is the kingdom in which ends 
are sovereign. But they are not sovereign as objects, nor 
as subjects. Besides, sovereignty is never the fact of either 
an object or a subject: Bataille was in no hurry to think 
otherwise. Ends are sovereign as ends, that is, as tasks. 
We should here rehabilitate teleo-logy, which we always 
 73 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 58–9.
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relegate to the closure of discourse, or, to speak like Lyo-
tard, to the ‘archi-teleological grand narrative’. There are 
two concepts of the end—or rather, presumably the end 
itself constantly divides itself into two concepts: the sko-
pos and the telos (the Stoics are well versed in this distinc-
tion). The skopos is the goal that one has in sight and that 
one aims for, it is the target, clearly present and offered 
to a view, which it determines; furthermore, the same 
word also designates the one who aims, and one who sur-
veys, looks after, has the controlling hand of a master or 
protector. The telos, however, is the accomplishment of 
an action or process, its development up to its terminal 
point (if you like: the fruit is not the target of the tree, any 
more than the target is the fruit of the archer). The telos, 
then, can also designate the summit, the culminating 
point, or again the highest power, or sovereign jurisdic-
tion. The end that is the telos is not a targeted end, it is an 
end in the sense of the greatest possible development of 
something, beyond which there is nothing that this thing 
could still become. This is also why the telos is inseparable 
from existence. The telos, in a way, is more characterised 
by entelechy than it is by teleology. Skopos is the drawing 
of the bow, telos is life and death. The kingdom of ends is 
the greatest possible development of freedom, considered 
as the faculty to propose ends, that is, to begin by itself 
a series of phenomena, resulting in its greatest possible 
development. The telos belongs to the kingdom of ends 
regardless of whether this accomplishment is that of a 
whole universe, or of a single act of judgement without 
any possible consequences (for example, if I happen to 
die immediately after I pronounce it).
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The imperative is the imperative of the telos of uni-
versal sovereignty—or of the universality of sovereignty, 
that is, of a free legislation whose rule is precisely the rule 
of the end, the rule of bilden, to form and cultivate the 
final faculty, the ‘will giving universal law’, which is there-
fore ‘supreme lawgiver’.74 Therefore, ‘of all man’s ends in 
nature, we are left only with a formal, subjective condi-
tion, that, namely, of the aptitude for setting ends before 
himself at all, and, independent of nature in his power 
of determining ends, of employing nature as a means in 
accordance with the maxims of his free ends generally.’75 
The telos of man is teleological-being itself: ‘we find in the 
world beings of only one kind whose causality is teleolog-
ical, or directed to ends, and which at the same time are 
beings of such character that the law according to which 
they have to determine ends for themselves is represented 
by them themselves as unconditioned and not dependent 
on anything in nature, but as necessary in itself.’76 But this 
telos (and this is once again its specific difference from 
the skopos) does not, then, constitute a model given in 
advance, an original to be matched or taken up.
The regulatory system, once again, involves a mime-
tology or a mimetological ontology, but not an imitative 
one. One has to bilden the Bild, not bilden according to 
a Bild. The rule of what something must be to appear as 
a house cannot refer to a given house, nor to architec-
tural precepts, but it ushers in whole fields—economic, 
 74 Ibid. 40.
 75 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 260.
 76 Ibid. 263–4.
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political, erotic, aesthetic, technical—whose rules are, in 
turn, without model, but obey the prescription to inhabit 
the world. The imperative and duty are categories of this 
mimetology, which we could call ‘anarchetypical’, or per-
haps ‘anarchic’.
For this reason, the fact that the law of setting ends 
for oneself, that is, the law of judging, is the very law 
of man, and that the end itself, the telos, is teleological-
being, being that proposes ends, does not mean that the 
sovereignty of will consists in being its own principle 
for itself, and its own end, nor that sovereign freedom 
consists of self-determination, self-legislation, and self-
management. Certainly, we can list Kant’s texts that 
address the thematic of the self-sufficiency of the will. 
For example, ‘the will is not merely subject to the law 
but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed as 
also giving the law to itself.’77 Here again, however, some-
thing resists the modern subjective hypostasis of the will 
or of desire. The institution of the law by the will is itself 
designated only through submission. Undoubtedly, the 
mode of this submission is not that of subservience to 
a constraint that would be incompatible with freedom. 
But nor is it the simple spontaneous acquiescence of a 
substance with the laws of its own nature, as is the case 
in Spinozian freedom (which is the truth of metaphysi-
cal freedom in general). The will is not self-engendered 
in freedom, it is and indeed remains subjected to the law 
of a freedom that remains inconceivable to it. If you like, 
there is nothing outside freedom that would come to 
 77 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 39.
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bring it under submission, but freedom itself is exterior 
to man, and dictates its law to him. Krüger’s commen-
tary has perfectly identified this crucial point, which we 
could call the point of no return of the imperative, or the 
insurmountable, undialectisable character of the sub-
mission of the will. Referring to the text that I have just 
cited, Krüger emphasises that the will must be viewed as 
giving the law to itself, and that Kant adds in a parenthe-
sis: ‘of which [the law] it can regard itself as the author’.78 
Autonomy, comments Krüger, ‘is a “point of view” from 
which man must consider himself. For man to “be able to 
consider himself ” in this way is demanded and not pre-
supposed as a reality.’ We can go further still by reading 
the whole passage of the Groundwork of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals from which Krüger borrows the expression 
‘regard itself as’:
A rational being belongs as a member to the king-
dom of ends when he gives universal laws in it but is 
also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as 
sovereign when, as lawgiving, he is not subject to the 
will of any other.
A rational being must always regard himself as 
lawgiving in a kingdom of ends possible through 
freedom of the will, whether as a member or as sov-
ereign. He cannot, however, hold the position of sov-
ereign merely by the maxims of his will but only in 
case he is a completely independent being, without 
needs and with unlimited resources adequate to his 
will.79
 78 Gerhard Krüger, Critique et morale chez Kant, trans. Marcel Régnier 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1961), 130.
 79 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 41.
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Man cannot, then, claim the place of the sovereign (Ober-
haupt). Law-giving sovereignty is not self-sufficient 
sovereignty, and the moment of legislating judging is 
indissolubly also the moment of a submission to the law. 
Kantian autonomy implies, as if at its very heart, an irre-
ducible heteronomy. The heterogeneous, here, is the law 
itself. For it is indeed the law of the will, but precisely as 
law that first of all commands and brings to submission. 
We can hardly put it better than Krüger when he says: 
‘For Kant, the concept of autonomy expresses only the 
character of submission, which is completely without 
reserve. In the concept of giving the law to itself, “self ” 
signifies, not unconditional “creative” freedom that obeys 
only itself, that wishes to be faithful to itself according to a 
law, but rather unconditional responsibility before the law, 
the very thing from which freedom itself cannot escape. 
The dignity of humanity is found, for Kant, not in its 
spontaneous independence, but in its moral subjection.’80
Submission is insurmountable because the law is not 
the self-production of the will. On the contrary, the law 
is precisely that I do not self-produce myself as lawgiver, 
but that I have the task of making law that is universal. 
My freedom does not have value as self-sufficiency but 
as destination towards this universal lawgiving, or as 
destination towards the judgement of ends. This destina-
tion—Bestimmung—is, once again, a determination: I am 
determined in my autonomy as much as I am destined for 
it. Autonomy itself is the determination—or finitude—of 
 80 Krüger, Critique et morale chez Kant, 131.
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one who must judge without the universal being presented 
to him. This is why the universal is given to this auton-
omy as a task, and is consequently given to it in the form 
of a command. The gift of freedom, the gift of ends and 
of the cosmopoliteia is indeed a gift (no captatio benevo-
lentiae of a nonexistent Absolute could obtain it for us), 
but it is the gift of ‘you must’. Or in other words again, it 
is an announcement or a promise: that must take place, 
that must occur, but the announcement or promise has 
value only, and precisely, from that which must happen 
by the judgement of my ‘good will’—and consequently 
the announcement is integrally converted into the order: 
you must.
I am destined for the sovereignty of the law, but this is 
why the law is addressed to me as an order. The impera-
tive brings about my submission; it does not constrain 
me. There is no power of coercion—which would be con-
trary to freedom—and it actually has this particularity, 
which Lyotard discusses in Just Gaming, of placing me 
ipso facto (and this is once again the factum rationis) in 
the position of obedience or submission. It has the effec-
tiveness of a posture, not of an execution. In this way it 
determines me, destines me.
I am therefore in a position of respect relative to the 
sovereignty of the law, which is a sentiment of reason, or a 
non-pathological sentiment. Respect is non-servile affec-
tion, and it is, symmetrically, thwarted desire. As such, 
it is the condition of my destination towards sovereign 
judgement (and this condition is not aleatory: even in the 
use of maxims that have been corrupted at root, which 
80 Dies Irae
can result from radical evil81—which is itself the index of 
our freedom—, even in the use of such maxims we cannot 
lose respect for the law, as Religion Within the Bounds of 
Bare Reason tells us . . . , and if we were to lose it, we could 
no longer get it back:82 it is therefore just as proper as it 
is not appropriable). However, respect, first of all, judges 
me, and it is a judgement of humiliation.83 Respect first of 
all expresses the incommensurability of my pretensions 
(or weaknesses) and of the sovereignty of the law. It is the 
judgement of humiliation, whose criterion is the incom-
mensurable. This means that respect, which creates my 
relation to the law, is strictly the sentiment of the sub-
lime. (In general, we should analyse how the problematic 
of the sublime in the third Critique, far from obeying the 
programme of an aesthetic for which it is supposedly a 
rubric, proceeds from necessities inscribed in the second 
Critique—and also how the whole aesthetic critique is 
ordered in relation to the sublime.)
As we know, ‘delight in the sublime does not so much 
involve positive pleasure as admiration or respect, i.e. 
merits the name of a negative pleasure.’84 This negative 
pleasure—which, I repeat, is not masochistic pleasure or 
displeasure, but ‘a pleasure that is only possible by means 
 81 [Translator’s note: ‘radical evil’ here relates etymologically to the 
maxims’ being ‘corrupted at root’ (‘radical’ derives from the Latin 
‘radix’, meaning ‘root’).]
 82 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. 
Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 2009), 52.
 83 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.
 84 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 76. Cf. also 88.
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of a displeasure’85—is a judgement86. The real sentiment 
of the sublime supposes that a judgement has been given 
within me, and recognised, regarding my own judge-
ment. It nonetheless does not consist in servile religious 
fear, but in the free exposure to judgement that measures 
my judgement by my destination:
In religion, as a rule, prostration, adoration with 
bowed head, coupled with contrite, timorous pos-
ture and voice, seems to be the only becoming de-
meanour in presence of the Divinity, and accord-
ingly most peoples have assumed and still observe 
it. Yet this cast of mind is far from being intrinsically 
and necessarily involved in the idea of the sublimity 
of a religion and of its object. . . . [A]dmiring divine 
greatness [requires] a mood of calm reflection and 
a quite free judgement . . . Only when he becomes 
conscious of having a disposition that is upright and 
acceptable to God, do those operations of might [na-
ture in a storm, a tempest etc.] serve to stir within 
him the idea of the sublimity of this being, so far as 
he recognizes the existence in himself of a sublimity 
of disposition consonant with the divine will, and is 
thus raised above the dread of such operations of na-
ture, in which he no longer sees God pouring forth 
his wrath. Even humility, taking the form of an un-
compromising judgement upon [our] shortcomings 
. . . is a sublime temper of the mind . . .87
Without a doubt, it is a beautiful soul who speaks these 
words. But let it speak, and let us note only the structure: 
 85 Ibid. 90.
 86 [Editor’s note. In French ‘peine’ (here translated as ‘displeasure’) 
can also mean ‘sorrow’, ‘sadness’, but also ‘punishment’ and even 
‘sentence’]
 87 Ibid. 94.
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it is the structure of a judgement that, in order to conform 
to the destination towards freedom, can only function by 
exposing itself to the judgement of this destination. A free 
judgement is measured against nothing but freedom. That 
is, at the limit of my ability to judge, and against incon-
ceivable and unpresentable absolute grandeur. It humili-
ates me, consequently, but this humiliation is not a fear 
of God’s wrath, precisely because absolute grandeur does 
not present itself. However, sublime humiliation gives me 
the rule of the presentability of this grandeur, the rule of 
the task of having to judge according to this grandeur. 
That is, of having to assume in my judgement the infinite 
distance from its telos—not to relativise, nor discourage, 
nor condemn my judgement, but rather to make it the 
very judgement of an infinite destination, here and now. 
The negative pleasure of the sublime is the displeasure of 
the task at stake, as a task of freedom. Therefore we judge 
as we should only in the adoration of the sublime: but we 
do not adore ‘with bowed head’ as we do in church; on 
the contrary, Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason 
defines adoration (in the ‘contemplation of the profound 
wisdom of divine creation in the smallest things and of 
its majesty on the large scale’) as that which ‘put[s] the 
mind into that sinking mood annihilating, as it were, 
the human being in his own eyes’, but which is also, ‘in 
consideration of his own moral vocation therein, such a 
soul-elevating power [seelenerhebend; the sublime is das 
Erhabene] that words by comparison, even if they were 
those of the royal David in prayer . . . would have to van-
ish like empty sound.’88 The ‘elevation’ in adoration is only 
 88 Kant, Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, 218.
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proportional to an annihilation and to that ‘feeling of a 
momentary check to the vital forces’ that characterises 
the feeling of the sublime.89 There is finally neither eleva-
tion nor abasement, these are not measured. The sublime 
is more accurately characterised by an immobilisation or 
a suspension. It suspends finitude on its own in-finitude, 
on the fact (factum) that it is not completed—for this is 
what it means, to be finished, finite—, that it is not its own 
telos, because it must still pronounce the judgement and 
accomplish the task of this telos.
The judgement of the sublime is precisely the judge-
ment that I must judge. This is why the sublime is not 
so ‘sublime’, by which I mean so grandiloquent, as it is 
presented by the pre-Romantic apparatus of the ‘sublime 
of nature’ (which is, besides, always ‘inaccurately named’; 
and I shall leave for another day the case, which was 
hypothetical for Kant, of the sublime in art, which would 
demand the form of either a didactic poem, a tragedy, or 
an oratorio). The sublime has a sober manner: ‘Simplic-
ity (artless purposiveness) is, as it were, the style adopted 
by nature in the sublime. It is also that of morality. The 
latter is a second . . . nature.’ Simplicity is distinguished 
from the ‘ardour of unbounded imagination’ and from 
‘Schwärmerei’, ‘fanaticism, which is a delusion that would 
will some vision beyond all the bounds of sensibility; i.e. 
would dream according to principles.’90 Simplicity corre-
sponds to the ‘most sublime’ commandment of the Bible, 
 89 Kant, Critique of Judgement, 75–6.
 90 Ibid. 104–5. [Editor’s note: Nancy and Lyotard always translate 
‘Schwärmerei’ as enthusiasm though the word carries both mean-
ings: enthusiasm and fanaticism].
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the prohibition against representing God. The sublime of 
simplicity consists in not representing, that is, according 
to a strict interpretation of the term in the ontology of 
subjectivity, of not making a representation for ourselves of 
the unconditional. It consists rather in judging—in judg-
ing with simplicity—, since it is free judgement, which is 
itself the unconditional, that obliges us. The presentation 
of the unconditional would be the suppression of judge-
ment—and the suppression of the unconditional.
Because of this, judgement on the sublime is strictly 
‘underivable’ (in Lyotard’s terms). Its exposition, Kant 
claims, is simultaneously its deduction, since we find in it 
‘a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties, which has 
to be laid a priori at the basis of the faculty of ends (the 
will), and which is therefore itself a priori purposive. This, 
then, at once involves the deduction, i.e. the justification 
of the claim of such a judgement to universally-necessary 
validity.’91 The deduction answers the question quid juris?: 
that which is according to the law, is that our faculties 
relate to an end that is their own limit, the limit of their 
freedom in the sense that it is at this limit that freedom 
begins.
Freedom is finitude as beginning, inauguration, the ini-
tiation of a world as in-finite series of phenomena of free-
dom itself. The fact that the series is infinite is the only 
guarantee of universality, and the only guarantee that, for 
each finite being, such a beginning can once again occur. 
 91 Ibid. 110. See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dis-
pute, trans. Georges Van den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988).
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This entails—and here I am in agreement with Lyotard—
that the totality of the series cannot be represented, and 
that it should not be. Or, perhaps more precisely, that the 
model of totality, since there always is one, whether it is 
unity or plurality (and, perhaps, can we even be satisfied 
with this ‘or’? . . . ), should be designated only in rela-
tion to a freedom that is always other, that is capable of 
re-beginning another world within this world. This alter-
ity of freedom (its sublimity) then inscribes itself only as 
law. What is inscribed in this way is not the law of the 
Other, but the other as law. The other as law does not 
mean that it is the other who makes the law. The other 
does not make it as a lawgiving member of the kingdom, 
any more or less than I do. But the other as law means that 
the law is that there is an other. The law is the arrival of 
the other—and arrival at the other.
Certainly, this amounts to a difference in sentence 
structure. But I would say that it is this difference, applied 
to yet another phrase, and different in a different way, a 
sentence less pronounced than it is pronouncing, that 
suspends speech at the same time that it opens it up, let’s 
say the sentence of respect or adoration, or we could also 
say the sentence of submission, or abandonment, without 
which no phrase—be it prescriptive, narrative, or even 
constative—could be articulated. But also by which all 
sentences are judged, without giving rise to any sort of 
terror.
This articulating and non-articulated sentence, unique 
but not unitary, I shall no longer henceforth call a sen-
tence, and certainly not a meta-sentence, but an art or a 
style, following Kant when he speaks of simplicity as the 
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‘style’ of the sublime. (And this would not be unrelated 
to the music that Daniel Charles was discussing the day 
before yesterday). Art or style (we are concerned again 
here with mimesis) would be that which articulates each 
sentence, first of all, in accordance with a respect for the 
fact that I shall never articulate the sovereignty of which 
I speak, on pain of abolishing it, and according to this 
related respect for the fact that it is also sovereignty that 
articulates the sentence of the other. This respect is not the 
‘democratic’ respect of opinions, it is the more ambiguous 
demand, the more insistent assertion of the sovereignty 
of the law. The style of judgement must be this demand-
ing submission. Style is the justice of judgement.—As for 
what ‘style’ might then be, the style of sovereignty and 
community, is a question for another line of research. 
I shall make only this one point, which I know to be in 
accordance with Lyotard, that we should be concerned 
here with an art of community, but definitely not with 
community as work of art, by which I mean that vision 
that Syberberg presented in his film Hitler.92
Six.—In the 1764 Observations on the Feeling of the Beau-
tiful and Sublime, after having distinguished the beautiful 
that ‘charms’ from the sublime that ‘touches’, Kant divided 
the latter into the ‘terrifying sublime’, ‘accompanied with 
some dread or even melancholy’, the ‘noble sublime’, 
 92 Roger Laporte subsequently brought to my attention this sentence 
from Proust: ‘art [is] the most real of all things, the most austere 
school of life, the true last judgement.’ Marcel Proust, In Search 
of Lost Time: VI, Time Regained, trans. Andreas Mayor and Ter-
ence Kilmartin (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), 233. Cf. Hitler: 
A Film from Germany, dir. Hans-Jürgen Syberberg (Film Galerie, 
2004 [1977]).
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accompanied by ‘quiet admiration’, and the ‘magnificent 
sublime’, connected to ‘a beauty spread over a sublime 
prospect’.93 But immediately afterwards, in a note, he gives 
a single example, an example that does not correspond 
exactly to the division that had been proposed, since it 
is the example of a ‘noble dread’, and of ‘the noble dread 
which the description of a total solitude can inspire’. The 
example is that of a certain ‘Carazans Traum’, published 
in the Bremisches Magazin94. Carazan is a miser who has 
‘bar[red] his heart to the compassion and the love of oth-
ers’, and who relates the dream of his last judgement: ‘I 
saw the angel of death come upon me like a whirlwind, 
and he struck me, before I could plead against the terrible 
blow. I was petrified as I became aware that my fate had 
been cast for eternity, and that to all the good I had done, 
nothing could be added, and from all the evil that I had 
done, nothing could be subtracted.’ God pronounces his 
condemnation, and ‘in this moment I was ripped away 
by an invisible force and driven through the shining edi-
fice of creation. I quickly left innumerable worlds behind 
me. As I approached the most extreme limit of nature, I 
noticed that the shadows of the boundless void sank into 
the abyss before me. A fearful realm of eternal silence, 
solitude and darkness!’95
 93 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
the Sublime and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Patrick Frierson and 
Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16.
 94 John Hawkesworth, Carazans Traum. Eine morgenländische 
Erzählung, in ‘Bremisches Magazin zur Ausbreitung der Wissen-
schaften, Künste und Tugend’, vol. 4, 1761, 539–46.
 95 Ibid. Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful 
and the Sublime, cit., 16–17.
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The last judgement (which, in this case, a pedantic the-
ologian would call a ‘particular judgement’) was there-
fore Kant’s first example of the sublime. I could not say 
whether the prose is exactly simple, but I would remark 
on the one hand that the condemnation in it is essentially 
that of solitude (Kant’s text goes on to emphasise this) and 
that it is executed by the infinite crossing and the negative 
kosmotheoria of an inhabited universe, and on the other 
hand, that this sublime, although it belongs to the noble 
type because at the end of the dream the miser rediscov-
ers his love of humanity, is nonetheless mixed with the 
terrifying type. The last judgement is inseparable from 
the wrath of God, and so from religious servility and 
pathological constraint. Kant could not have used this 
same example after the composition of the third Critique.
Was it right, then, to speak of a last judgement in this 
case? The final judgement, the one that judges my judge-
ment every time, or the other as judgement, are these 
related to the last judgement? Yes, Kant answers, thirty 
years later, yes, in the circumstances of a game with Ideas. 
This game with Ideas is the status that he confers on his 
work of 1794, The End of All Things.96 This text plays at 
exploiting the resources of the representation of the last 
judgement, that is, in principle of a terrifying representa-
tion that belongs to the false sublime of religions. I shall, 
in turn, play along: I shall attempt to decipher the part of 
it that interests us here.
 96 Immanuel Kant, The End of All Things, trans. Allen Wood, in 
Religion and Rational Theology, ed. and trans. Allen Wood and 
George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 217–33 (225 ff.).
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The first Idea is that of the end of time as entry into 
eternity. It can strictly designate only the passage to an 
incommensurable, absolute grandeur with time, a duratio 
noumenon of which we cannot grasp even the slightest 
concept. It places us on the brink of an abyss that is both 
terrifying and fascinating. Taking up the same distinc-
tions from the Observations on the Feeling of the Beauti-
ful and Sublime, Kant names this thought the ‘terrifying 
sublime’. But, considered from the moral perspective, this 
end of all things is the beginning of a supra-sensible exist-
ence that is not subjected to the conditions of time.
This beginning, on the one hand, no longer presupposes 
the physical annihilation of time, and on the other hand, 
as beginning, must indeed take place in time. However, 
that which, with regard to the end of all things, still takes 
place in time, is the last day. The last day still belongs to 
time, that is, something still occurs. What occurs is the 
settling of accounts. It is the day of judgement.—The first 
lesson of the last judgement is therefore already implicit. 
It is in fact explicit in Religion Within the Bounds of Bare 
Reason, where it is claimed that the symbolic narrative of 
the end of the world (the Apocalypse) ‘presented as an 
event that (like the end of life, whether near or far) can 
not be seen beforehand, expresses very well the neces-
sity to be always ready for it, but in fact (if one bases this 
symbol on its intellectual meaning) always to look upon 
ourselves actually as appointed citizens of a divine (ethi-
cal) state.’97 What is still in time is always in time, and, 
reciprocally, time is always on the brink of the abyss of 
 97 Kant, Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, 150.
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its end, for which there can be no fixed time. The rule of 
time is that we cannot see the end of time. But in time the 
imperative is that at every instant the task of Cosmopo-
liteia begins. Precisely because it is the Idea, it cannot be 
entrusted to the next day. The Idea is the Idea of the end 
of time at all times.
We could say that practical reason is unaware of the 
first analogy of experience, that of substance as perma-
nent substrate of change. For practical reason, existence 
is born and dies at every moment; it is constantly on the 
brink of the abyss, and its only ‘substance’ is a task. But that 
perhaps also means that practical reason is only actually 
reason according to time, and that ‘inner sense’ is perhaps 
after all essentially practical. And so the critique of the 
paralogisms of reason is necessary for the emergence of 
the practical subject. And this ‘subject’ (not a substance), 
man, who is never what he must be, is also always-already 
what he must be. A fragment of the Opus Postumum says: 
‘The temporal conditions, which make the representation 
of humanity and of its end into appearances of sensible 
intuition, disappear if the generic destination of man as 
founded in his reason has the ultimate end as its princi-
ple; for man is already the being that he foresees that he 
will become.’98
This is why man is already free, with a freedom which 
is incomprehensible and imperative. Freedom is then the 
only ‘substance’ of the practical ‘subject’, but the substan-
tiality of this substance resides exclusively in the fact of 
 98 Immanuel Kant, Opus postumum, ed. and trans. Jean Gibelin (Paris: 
Vrin, 1950), 75.
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being mobile, in both senses of the word: mobile with 
the mobility of beginnings, at each moment, and the 
incomprehensible mobilising force of an acting-through-
pure-duty. Kant writes in Religion Within the Bounds of 
Bare Reason: ‘I admit that I cannot well accommodate 
myself to the expression, used presumably by astute men 
as well. A certain people (engaged in working for a legal 
freedom) is not yet ripe for freedom; the bondmen of a 
landed proprietor are not yet ripe for freedom; and thus 
also, human beings as such are not yet ripe for freedom 
of faith. According to such a presupposition, freedom will 
never arrive; for, one cannot ripen to freedom if one has 
not previously been set free (one must be free in order 
to be able to use one’s powers purposively in freedom).’99
The day of judgement then, is the emergence and 
bringing up to date of the last end—of the kingdom of 
freedom. This kingdom emerges on this day, on each day 
as day of judgement. If men are fascinated by the end of 
the world (and they all are; it is, says Kant, an idea woven 
into human reason), it is because duration has value only 
inasmuch as we are present in it in conformity with the 
last end, whether this end is or is not brought about. And 
if men attach terrifying representations to this idea, it is 
because of the corruption of man and his falling short of 
the law, which condemns him to the day of judgement.
But Kant precisely leaves condemnation and salvation 
outside his discussion. The two possible doctrines, those 
of the unitarians, who consider that everyone is saved, and 
that of the dualists (for a doctrine of universal condemna-
 99 Kant, Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, 209.
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tion would be absurd) cannot give rise to a dogma. And 
Kant suggests that, if ‘dualism’ has the advantage from a 
practical point of view, since it shows each person how he 
must judge himself, it nonetheless hits upon the difficulty 
of thinking that even a single reasonable being could have 
been created for eternal condemnation. Clearly, it is not 
the logic of reward and punishment that commands here, 
but that of duty and of end.
And yet the representation of reward and punishment 
attached to the image of the last judgement must be con-
sidered in relation to the ‘indispensable supplement’ that 
Christianity adds to the pure respect of the law. This sup-
plement is love, defined as the fact of ‘freely accepting 
among one’s maxims the will of an other’. Punishments 
are therefore not incentives but well-meaning warnings 
about the consequences of the violation of the law. And 
nor are rewards incentives, since the creature’s love is not 
directed towards the good that is received but towards the 
generosity of the giver. In other words, this ‘indispensa-
ble supplement’ is nothing other than the love of the law 
inasmuch as the law is a gift. The gift is confused with 
the imposition of the law (it takes away nothing from the 
law’s imperative character as such) and adds itself to it 
at the same time. What is given is freedom—it does not 
give a good, it gives nothing. A gift is always free, and 
never gives anything except this freedom, which is the 
freedom of ‘accepting among one’s maxims the will of an 
other’.—The last judgement then signifies simultaneously 
that there is, on the day of judgement, no other grace pos-
sible except this gift, but that this gift is also always in 
itself a supplementary grace. I am always-already judged, 
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but I am never yet judged. That signifies neither that I am 
saved nor that I am innocent, but that I always still have 
the task of exposing myself to judgement.
The day of judgement is not dies irae, the day or rather 
night of religion and fear, it is only dies illa, that illustrious 
day, the sublime day when freedom, law, and the other 
give me order and the gift of judging. The day of lyo tar, 
any day at all, this very day, dies haec, hic et nunc, the eter-
nity of judgement.
Seven.—In this genesis, there is no day of rest.
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